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This letter presents a new mathematical index (Author’s index; Aindex) for comparison of 
authors/scholars. The index was a medal winner in ISEBA 2017; an annual international 
exhibition and competition for social sciences innovation in Malaysia.  
 
Comparison of scholars is a need for performance appraisal in scientific communities. 
However, only a small number of indexes have been introduced by the scientific communities 
themselves. Almost all the introduced indexes (e.g., SCI, Hirsch's or h-index, Egghe's g-
index, M-Quotient, Zhang's e-index, etc.) consider only citation impact of the authors’ works. 
Very few indices consider the productivity of the authors. The Aindex is among the first 
authorship metrics that attempts to measure citation impact of the author’s publications 
together with his/her productivity. The Aindex minimize the disadvantages of currently 
available indexes; therefore, making it a fairer tool for comparison of scholars.  
As shown in equation 1, the Aindex is based on the number of citations that an author 
received for his/her publications. Considering fairness and ethics of citation, the value of self-
citation in this formula is lower. Different rank/level of journals is also considered in the 
formula, as the Q level of the journal in criteria in the Aindex. Q could be based on current 
calculation of Scopus or Thomson Reuters (ISI) or any other indexing services.  If a journal is 
among the first top quarter of the journals in the same field of publication, the Q will be the 
highest, 4. For the second quartered journal and the third quartered journals, Q will be 3 and 2 
respectively. Finally, if the journal is in the last quarter, the Q can be 1. Mostly the quality 
ranking of the journal will be published the year following publication; for example, if you 
publish in 2016, the quality ranking of the journal for 2016 will be calculated in 2017. The 
better quality the ranking, the higher the Q – a factor that shows higher productivity for an 
author. Number of authors in a paper is another criterion for evaluating the productivity of the 
scholar. The fewer named team members on a paper, the higher the productivity of a scholar. 
Last, but not least, comes the period of publishing and academic working. A scholar with 
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Y: duration of calculation 
Y0: Starting year of the duration of calculation: for example, academic activity, or year of the 
first publication 
YN: Ending year of the duration of calculation: for example, academic activity, or year of the 
last publication 
C: citation 
SC: Self citation 
A: number of authors 
N: Total number of publication 
Q: Quality mark of the journal 
 
 
The validity of the new index was examined by peers of the ISEBA 2017. Formula 2 is the 
modified Aindex with considering the comments from fellow researchers participating in 
ISEBA 2017. The introduced modification considers the academic seniority of the authors; as 
publication output expectations are higher for senior authors. Now the index could be 
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Abstract: Apart from the evident attributes and tendencies of digital media that justify the 
social and politico-economic criticism of understanding their structure and relevant 
mechanisms, under certain circumstances they indeed show traits of effective online 
mobilisation for (sub)political participation. Two case studies are given to demonstrate the 
mobilisation potential within digital media in the context of ethnic identity-related 
(sub)political engagement, and to juxtapose such qualities with other patterns conditioned by 
large-scale politico-economic and international power-related structures and agendas. Such 
findings that confirm the understanding of digital media as platforms and applications for 
organic and uncompromised online participation and networking can support reclaiming 
digital media’s optimist aspirations to be a public sphere. Herein a via media is proposed 
between digital optimism and digital pessimism in support of earlier nuanced approaches to 
the social functions of digital media, which indeed correctly recognised the limits of online 
environment as a hypothetical public sphere, thus can be referred to as digital realist. 
 
 







The debate around the social implications of digital media has become polarised between 
contradicting notions. Accordingly, digital media has recently been interpreted in the context 
of certain universalist digital optimistic visions anchored by a form of a hypothetical 
electronic agora: what is seen as a platform for communities of practice; (Shirky 2009) and/or 
a forum of unlimited self-expression (Ghoneim 2012) and/or a new public sphere (Benkler 
2006; Castells 2009; Wellman 2011) due to its allegedly interactive, emancipatory, 
democratizing and empowering capacities. On the other hand, opposing views of digital 
pessimism hold that as digital media intersects other social, political, and economic factors, it 
becomes compromised as tendencies of information control and surveillance (i.e., Robins – 
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Webster 1998) censorship and propaganda (Morozov 2011) and/or the politics/economy of 
digital capitalism (Schiller 1999; Aouragh 2012) can clearly be observed. The first approach, 
either out of naivety or negligence and/or other reasons, ignores various kinds of power 
realities Whilst the latter either falls in the trap of an academic paranoia or out of an 
excessive skepticism, underestimates their capacities for supporting certain grassroots 
movements, that later, in fact, turn out to be, or seem to be successful without serving, in 
essence, any “hidden agenda.” 
Ever since my first forays into the contemporary discourses of digital media (Iványi 
2015), I have considered these corresponding, antagonistic arguments reductive vis-à-vis the 
complex reality of digital media’s social implications. On the other hand, digital pessimistic 
and optimistic views otherwise seem to be valid to a certain degree, as both offer partial truth 
that needs to be captured and integrated.As this will be shown, a remarkable part of the 
surrounding discussion is articulated around whether or not digital media constitutes a/the 
new public sphere. I support balanced approaches (e.g., Habermas 2006; Neuman 2010; 
Papacharissi 2010; van Dijck 2012; Fuchs 2014), which I hereinafter call ‘digital realist’ tout 
court, in their efforts to examine and validate optimistic digital arguments about the 
hypothetical causal relationship between the cyberspace and community engagement. In this 
context, nothing more and nothing less is at stake, than an alternative public sphere (cf. 
Habermas, 1962), and this particular model of digital realism owes a great deal to the 
mentioned, nuanced and complex approaches for setting up an inspirational environment. In 
this spirit, I seek to identify the objective foundations or ultimate grounds of the social 
mobilising potential within digital media by focusing on two independent case studies and 
assessing whether such practices correspond to the existing views mentioned above. This 
paper at hand thus examines what I believe to be fundamental in understanding social 
dynamics of digital media, namely group activities without any direct links to 
politics/economics, such as the online dimension of a movement (practically: an online group 
on a social networking site) that aims to achieve the goal of bilingual language use in public 
areas of Southern Slovakia, and another group that intended to boycott a transnational 
brewing company. Both activities have become important online social fora in Hungary and 
its neighboring countries so certain conclusions can be drawn about the topic at hand. I 
specifically chose to tackle action that is expressly related to ethnic identity-related civic 
participation which constitutes political action in a way but is generally independent of large-
scale politico-economic and international power-related structures and agendas. For the idea 
of focusing on online (sub)political action seems to me to offer the best hope of vindicating 
the mobilisation potential within digital media without overlooking the general validity of 
social and/or politico-economic criticism when discussing relevant social functions. Such 
identified potential can arguably challenge the existing cultural, social, and political realms of 
status quo by movements untied to power formations identified by digital pessimism (i.a. 
Morozov 2011; Aouragh 2012; Schiller 2014).  
My thesis considers hereinafter the main existing models of digital optimism and 
digital pessimism and finds them wanting in view of recent experiences, at the same time 
develops and defends a novel ’digital realist’ model as an intellectual middle road. Thus, in 
view of its pursuit of balance, the present paper follows the intellectual traditions of earlier 
nuanced approaches, however, it provides a significantly different point of view and field of 
analysis. Some of these standpoints although draw important conclusions concerning the 
social functions of digital media, mostly do not attach explicit importance to the component 
of ethnic identity in their fields of vision.   
In this spirit, this paper argues for recognizing digital media as being a viable tool for 
the expression of self-categorization-based (Tajfel & Turner 1986; McGuire 1988) ethnic 
identity (cf. McKinley et al., 2014) without being necessarily understood as 
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cyberbalkanization (cf. Sunstein 2009) and for (sub-)political engagement without being 
subjected to political factors described by current rather pessimistic or sceptic discourses of 
censorship, oppression (Morozov 2011), digital capitalism (Schiller 1999) or ICT-
imperialism and geopolitics (Aouragh 2012). All in all, this digital realist model at hand 
interprets digital media as a limited public sphere or public spherical (Neuman 2011; 
Cunningham 2001) and encourages further research whilst offers a via media between digital 
pessimism and optimism.  
 
Nature of digital media and reminiscences of a new public sphere  
Advocates of digital media tend to acknowledge these applications and services in question 
as a new surface, nay, a condito sine qua non for an alternative public sphere envisaged by 
Jürgen Habermas (1962). The intellectual source of such ideas springs from the opus magnum 
of Jürgen Habermas, namely the Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, even though the author 
himself could hardly have based his thesis on a back then “infant-aged” internet when 
introducing his thesis in question. Still, the normative notion deployed by Habermas that 
interprets the public sphere as “a society engaged in critical public debate” (1962: 52) has 
been projected onto the internet ever since.1 
 
Digital optimism  
Accordingly, all too often has it been assumed in this “post-Habermasian” tradition that 
internet per se liberates discussion and thus paves the way for egalitarianism and democracy 
(cf. Fuchs 2014: 57).  
                                                 
1 Arguably a reconstructed vision of the original universalist Habermasian (1962) concept determines among 
other factors the intellectual environment in which digital positivism emerged. As a consequence, the social 
implications of digital media have been idealistically interpreted although Habermas himself later on discussed 
the nexus of the public sphere and deliberative politics in a nuanced way, while also pointing out that there are 
certain critical conditions for the applicability of the communication model of deliberative politics (Habermas, 
2006). The original ideas elaborated by Jürgen Habermas and their reconstructed digital optimist heritage 
evoked significant criticism ever since for being unsatisfactory in terms of recognizing social inequality and 
being exclusive (Fraser, 1990; Calhoun, 1992; Warner, 2002). This paper does not aim to discover such 
supposed limits of the Habermasian public sphere. Rather, it focuses on the question in what terms can digital 
media be understood as the public sphere when at the same time, validity of some digital pessimist arguments 
also seems to be well-founded.  
Parallel to post-Habermasian digital optimistic tendencies, social criticism gave rise to opposite views. 
Reinterpreting French postmodern philosopher Michel Foucault’s (1979: 290) model of a panoptic (Bentham), 
sophisticated social surveillance (i.e., the power or ability of the state élite “to surveil, to invade the citizens’ 
privacy, gives the state the power to confuse, coerce and control citizens”) coauthors Kevin Robins and Frank 
Webster (1998) suggest that new communication and information technologies (i.e., digital media) give a new 
meaning to dissemination of power and control.  
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For instance, American media theorist Douglas Rushkoff (2002: 26–28) celebrated the online 
sphere’s “ability to network human beings” which “is its very life’s blood. It fosters 
communication, collaboration, sharing, helpfulness, and community… The ideas, 
information, and applications now launching on Web sites around the world capitalize on the 
transparency, usability, and accessibility that the internet was born to deliver.”  
Information technology of law professor Yochai Benkler (2006: 272) claims network 
“allows all citizens to change their relationship to the public sphere. They no longer need be 
consumers and passive spectators. They can become creators and primary subjects. It is in 
this sense that the Internet democratizes.” Apparently, Benkler (2006: 213) juxtaposes such 
hypothetical qualities with the horizon of an already idealized public sphere: “the easy 
possibility of communicating effectively into the public sphere allows individuals to reorient 
themselves from passive readers and listeners to potential speakers and participants in a 
conversation.”  
American writer, consultant, and lecturer on the social and economic effects of 
Internet technologies Clay Shirky (2009: 190) follows this intellectual path when discussing 
digital media: “by lowering transaction costs, social tools provide a platform for communities 
of practice...Communities of practice are inherently cooperative, and are beautifully 
supported by social tools, because that is exactly the kind of community whose members can 
recruit one another or allow themselves to be found by interested searchers.” 
Spanish sociologist and information society expert Manuel Castells (2009: 229) goes 
one step further, and proclaims “networked movements of our time are largely based on the 
Internet,” and Egyptian author Wael Ghonim (2012) applauded Facebook for having become 
a “means to express […] opinions, ambitions and dreams, without pressure from anyone” vis-
a-vis the experience of the January 25 Revolution in Egypt.   
A “doyen” of digital optimism, Canadian-American sociologist Barry Wellman 
(2011) also claims that use of “multiple means of communication […] affords “a more 
flexible, less bounded life for many.” He goes on to claim “the internet revolution” as he 
refers to such a complex phenomenon, “has created communication capacities that have 
dwarfed those of the past [namely that of traditional media] […] The proliferation of the 
internet has facilitated the move to even more networked modes of connectivity.” 
Connectivity insists public discussion, moreover deliberation, which supposed to provide a 
free vent for political participation.  
Christian Fuchs (2014: 57) correctly states, what also can be our synopsis of digital 
optimism for now, that although different, what such contributions have in common is that 
they are philosophically idealistic interpretations or revisions of the Habermasian public 
sphere concept.  
While this paper considers certain digital optimist arguments to be valid at the same 
time, it also should not overlook realities of geopolitical and/or sociopolitical factors (cf. 
Morozov, 2011, Aouragh, 2012), i.e., patterns of surveillance, censorship, and a self-
congratulatory agenda of digital capitalism to be touched upon below.  
 
Digital pessimism  
A critical stance towards digital optimism is based on notions and allegations of cyber-
sectarianism (Sunstein, 2002) which is the most important for our current thesis, but also 
intertwinement of corporate complaisance (Aouragh, 2012) and traits of censorship (Nashif, 
2017), panopticity, i.e., mass surveillance and geopolitical implications (Morozov, 2011, 
Robins and Webster, 1998) have been observed. The commodification of the Internet 
(Schiller, 1999) and transnational collaboration between the state and major companies 
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(Iványi, 2017) and other various negative or unknown socio-psychological impacts and 
implications are assumed.  
Extensive analysis of such fields of thought is beyond the scope of this paper, so the 
upcoming part is rather a schematic catalog of the main dispositions of relevant ideas.  
It is necessary to stress that some of the relevant authors do not necessarily or 
exclusively draw pessimistic conclusions. Morozov and Aouragh, while they indeed consider 
several contextual variabilities and follow nuances approaches, in fact, focus predominantly 
on the “dark side” of the Internet and “ICT-imperialism” respectively.  
 
Echo chambers and group polarization  
American legal scholar Cass Sunstein attributes to digital media a potential to promote “cyber 
cascades” of like-minded opinions that create “information cocoons” and can even foster or 
enflame hate groups. The author describes (2009: 94) the phenomenon when users live “in 
echo chambers of their own design.” Such media enclaves scarcely interact. Thus group 
polarization results in the decay of democracy and the absence of deliberative mechanisms.  
Although socio-psychological causes of such tendencies (i.e., group polarization) 
might be relevant when discussing member attitudes within later introduced experiences of 
Facebook groups, in our cases the consequences significantly differ: as neither ‘Let’s boycott 
the products of Heineken’ / Forbidden beer from Csík’ [Bojkottáljuk a Heinekent 
termékeket/Tiltott Csíki sör] nor ‘Bilingual South Slovakia’ [Kétnyelvű Dél-Szlovákia] 
groups’ members have been inclined towards hate speech or chauvinistic stances etc.   
 
The Panopticon: mass surveillance and censorship 
Belorussian-American author and researcher Evgeny Morozov (2011) expressed skepticism 
about digital optimism and Internet-centrism and pointed out the Internet is a tool that both 
revolutionaries and authoritarian governments can use. As a consequence, certain regimes 
remain stable and repressive as ever. Digital media sites have been used in these places to 
entrench dictators and threaten dissent opinion, making it more difficult to promote 
democracy.  
Morozov, while he does not deny positive effects of digital media, is no doubt focused 
on a negative phenomenon arising, which he calls the “dark side of internet freedom,” which 
might resolve in an overall judgment reflecting a rather mistrustful attitude towards digital 
media and its capacities.  
Insisting that Robins and Webster’s (1998) post-Foucauldian dystopia of a Panopticon 
might be based partly on reality, Facebook’s official Global Government Requests Report 
published on 27 April 2017 revealed that it’s receiving more government information 
requests than ever before. Although USA government removal requests were on a decline, 
requests for user account data, on the other hand, rose significantly.  
 
ICT-imperialism, digital capitalism, and commodification  
Such corporate complaisance is one facet of the political economy of digital media which has 
different implications. Information and communications historian Dan Schiller published his 
thesis as early as in 1999 stating networks that comprise cyberspace were originally created at 
the behest of government agencies, military contractors, and allied educational institutions. 
Recently, however, a growing number of these networks have begun to serve predominantly 
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corporate objectives. Under the sway of an expansionary market logic, the Internet began a 
political-economic transition toward what Dan Schiller calls digital capitalism. 
Moroccan-Dutch anthropologist Miriyam Aouragh (2012) investigated how the social, 
political, and cultural realms of capitalism (superstructure) are both conditioned by and react 
upon the political-economic base. Here it is necessary to add that although Aouragh (2012) 
while interpreting the political economy of the information and communications technology 
within the wider context of Marxist theory claims that the point of her critique was “not to 
deny the social and political usefulness of new media, but to examine the pros and cons of the 
internet,” she intensely stresses that arguments (or rather assertions) in the context of debates 
about the power of new media are echoes of earlier suggestions related to peculiar 
fetishizations of ICT in general and social media in particular. Aouragh also holds that 
fetishization of digital media and techno-clichés such as “Facebook-revolutions” can well 
originate in self-congratulatory poses of digital media interests. At the same time, no matter 
how valid most of her arguments are and how thought-provoking for the general and 
academic debate over the functions of digital media, she underestimates capacities of the 
latter to boost civic engagement under specific conditions.  
Van Dijck examines the socioeconomic structures that shape social media. While 
exploring the relevant ownership, governance, and business models, he also points to 
“economic infrastructures and legal-political governance” (2013: 26) that determine the 
evolution of networks as conditiones sine quibus non.  
 
 
A dialectic approach to understanding digital media  
Online activism indeed can be explained by reference to some form of a political and 
economic agenda and other social factors, as has already been shown via digital pessimism. 
Under special circumstances, however, as this also will be demonstrated through the prism of 
online activism of two separate cases, digital media indeed provides a playground for social 
mobilization without inevitably serving politics-economy-related or geopolitical agendas.  
In light of the prevalence of digital optimistic tendencies of exalting Web 2.0 and Co. 
in a way that reminisces a Murti-Bing (Witkiewicz, 1930) “hypnosis,” and late shift to a 
digital pessimistic antithesis that deals with computer-mediated technologies almost 
exclusively on the foundations of social and/or politico-economic criticism, the discourse has 
been reductive.  
I do believe new digital media can have an effect on social processes. What I doubt is 
whether experiences can exclusively be understood as either positive and negative. A number 
of authors who could well be referred to as digital realists have managed to approach the 
subject in a balanced way. 
Authors, such as inter alia Papacharissi (2010); Neuman (2011); van Dijck (2012); 
Fuchs (2014) conceptualize digital media in a more prudent way than digital optimism as we 
shall see below. According to Zizi Papacharissi (2010: 167) “new technologies provide 
opportunities for individuals to engage in social activities, expand the scope of social 
networks and enable communication.” Thus, the combined effect of the social, political, and 
economic and technological context “affords the autonomy, control, and expressive 
capabilities of that enable dissent, it effectively reconciles the personal with the political in a 
way that enables connection with like-minded individuals.” Although this approach reflects 
moderate optimism, the author elsewhere (2002: 9-10) expresses obvious doubts about the 
’revolutionizing’ effects of technologies on the political sphere suggesting they will rather be 
adapted to the current status quo. In addition, she points out that Internet-based technologies 
frequently fragmentize political discourse. Christian Fuchs (2014: 89) also finds that today’s 
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digital media landscape is “shaped by three antagonism: a) the economic antagonism between 
a) users’ data and social media corporations’ profit interests, b) the political antagonism 
between users’ privacy and the surveillance-industrial complex as well as citizens’ desire for 
accountability of the powerful and the secrecy of power, c) the civil society antagonism 
between the creation of public spheres and the corporate and state colonisation of these 
spheres.” 
When discussing the afterlife of the Habermasian argument, it is important to mention 
José van Dijck’s (2012) research, also reflecting a nuanced approach, insofar as it suggests 
“social media platforms neither warrant a recalibration of Habermas’ public sphere, nor a 
conscious blending of spheres.” She also advocates a different understanding which 
understands social media platforms as a “contested space where private, public and corporate 
interests compete to produce new norms of sociality and connectivity.” With regard to such a 
contested space in question, I hereby anticipate that certain fora on social networking sites 
(SNSs) in their own way practically allow activism and mobilisation for a given cause. These 
mentioned nuanced approaches, which objectively criticize the public sphere, without falling 
into the utopian trap, highlight the conceptual framework of digital realism in my view. 
Some of the following statements of an editorial article of the New York Times 
highlighting the geopolitical aspects of digital media use constitute an approach which can 
arguably called digital realist in essence: “Because social media businesses have become such 
a fixture in modern life, many people might think of them as the digital equivalent of the 
public square where opinions can be freely shared. But […] as much as free speech advocates 
would like Facebook and other Internet companies to uphold liberal values, these companies 
are unlikely to do so if that means sacrificing lucrative business opportunities.” Here, 
panoptic features meet ICT-interests, uniting some of the above-listed categories, and the 
corporate complaisance dimension becomes evident once again. But again, the prevalence of 
such factors does not mean, that grassroots online engagement would be completely made 
impossible. Experience of such online engagement, in fact, does presuppose a form of a 
limited public sphere, or in other words, public sphericules (cf. Cunningham 2001) 
 
 
Validity of an alternative public sphere 
W. Russel Neuman et al. (2011: 27-30) while following a “moderate” digital optimistic 
approach, that is a lot more cautious than the “mainstream” of above-quoted tendencies, 
provides a useful set of criteria, that can be regarded as some kind of a touchstone for 
understanding digital media as a successful online public sphere: 
1) the inclusion of a broad array of citizens in rational deliberation; 
2) the capacity to influence the agenda of public discussion; 
3) whether, once the attention is evident, the online environment facilitates rational 
critical discussion and the capacity for collective will formation; 
4) discursive equality and reciprocal respect – the capacity in collective deliberation to 
evaluate arguments by their sincerity and persuasive strength rather than the status of 
the speaker; 
5) the absence of a coercive external constraint on open discussion; 
6) the absence of systematic distraction from political deliberation.  
 
Although I doubt the revolutionary ethos that Neuman et al. generally attribute to the internet, 
I accept the relevance and constructivity of such standards as a basis for evaluating the online 
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environment. In this spirit, I will consistently use it when discussing experiences of digital 
media use hereinafter.  
In this spirit, recent evidence reflecting traits of a mobilization and arguably, even 
emancipatory potential of digital media will be demonstrated below with an intention to 
objectively and realistically evaluate cases in the light of Neuman et al. (2011)’s set of 
criteria.  
Another standard that seems to be useful is Danah Boyd (2008)’s analysis which 
centers on how social network sites can be understood as networked publics. Accordingly, the 
latter is simultaneously (1) the space constructed through networked technologies and (2) the 
imagined community that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, and 
practice. Consequently, networked publics support many of the same practices as unmediated 
publics, but their structural differences often inflect practices in unique ways. Four 
properties—persistence, searchability, replicability, and scalability—and three dynamics—
invisible audiences collapsed contexts, and the blurring of public and private need to be 
taken into consideration accordingly. Experiences of “public sphericules” where 
communities’ identity is formed through a sense of belonging via self-popularized media (cf. 
Cunningham, 2001) and social polarization tendencies of internet users to separate into 
groups with other people who share the same beliefs, i.e., “echo chambers” or audience 
fragmentation (Sunstein, 2009; Lynch, 2015) are well-known social psychological and public 
life phenomena enough to argue that digital media and online social networking sites (SNSs) 
in particular, where people also interact with others and express same beliefs, and content, 
might show similar characteristics.  
However, Sunstein’s (2009) rather digital pessimistic vision of cyberbalkanization 
which is predominantly based on his findings on partisan Weblogs that have become 
significant political forces has seemed to me logical, yet, disputable as groups not necessarily 
define against but also for something.  
People indeed define their identity by what they are not. Distinctiveness theory holds 
that people define themselves by what makes them different from others in a particular 
context: “one perceives oneself in terms of characteristics that distinguish oneself from other 
humans, especially from people in one’s usual social milieu” (McGuire, 1988).  
Social identity theory posits that a portion of one’s self-concept is dependent on the 
importance and relevance placed on the group membership(s) to which an individual belongs 
(Turner and Oakes, 1986). The theory suggests that individuals’ drive for positive identity 
and esteem influences the social comparisons they make (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In 
particular, group/category comparisons that accentuate group distinctiveness in favor of one’s 
in-group over a relevant outgroup are privileged. As a result, when a particular group 
becomes salient, the features associated with that group guide one’s attitudes and behaviors 
(McKinley et al., 2014).   
My research described below intends to indicate that given some particular cases in 
the context of self-categorization via digital media, the optimistic notion of the public sphere 
or public sphericules might be closer to reality than the pessimistic vision of echo chambers.  
In support of this hypothesis, a content analysis of relevant posts and page feedback, relevant 
statistics on the induced reaction were carried out as well as the findings of an anonymous 
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“Success stories” of online engagement  
 
Bilingual South Slovakia [Kétnyelvű Dél-Szlovákia] and online features of ethnicity  
Founded in 2011, Bilingual Slovakia [Kétnyelvű Dél-Szlovákia – hereinafter: KDSz]’s 
mission is to urge for action to promote bilingual public names. This paper focuses on the 
online dimension of KDSz and to evaluate relevant experiences.  
In accordance with a development which was also covered by mainstream media, 
railway station names in Dunaszerdahely [Dunajská Streda] and Révkomárom [Komárno], 
both located in ethnic Hungarian majority inhabited southern Slovakia, will not only be able 
to be read in the Slovak language but also in the minority Hungarian language. “Transport 
and Construction Minister Árpád Érsek and deputy speaker of parliament Béla Bugár (both 
members of the Most-Híd Party) officially unveiled the bilingual signs in the towns on April 
21. Thus the station in Dunajská Streda bears also the name Dunaszerdahely and the station 
in Komárno also Komárom” (Spectator, 2017).  
The bilingual boards will be set up only at railway stations in towns where at least 20 
percent of the population belongs to a national minority. 
In line with a government regulation, as many as 55 bilingual boards - 54 in 
Hungarian and one in the Rusyn language - will be placed at stations located in Slovak towns 
and cities with considerable non-Slovak populations. All the signs will be installed by the end 
of September. 
These developments above are exactly of the KDSz movement, which is also has been 
present on the social networking site Facebook.    
In an interview, a KDSz-activist expressed his conviction that this issue could not 
have been at the center of the Hungarian interest representation in Slovakia had the civil 
sphere – not just the KDSZ – not raised it and if the concerned parties would not feel that it 
needs to be addressed as a synergy (Maszol, 2017). 
In this spirit, KDSz introduces the movement, its goals, its principles and tools, 
objectives, and relations to politics at its Facebook-page as follows respectively:  
Information about the initiative: “We are civil activists who are concerned that the Hungarian 
language is becoming more and more distraught in southern Slovakia, although we have the 
right to written and oral use of our mother tongue.” 
Their objective is to promote the “visibility” of Hungarian language and minority 
living in Slovakia and raising awareness tout court. Explicitly, as described “Above all, we 
want the elimination of the visual discrimination of the Hungarian language, and thus, a more 
confident Hungarian community in Slovakia […] aim is not to exacerbate the pointless ethnic 
conflicts, but our intention is to make our community aware of its rights 
Their principles are respect for human dignity and nonviolence and tools are civil 
advocacy by raising the issue of bilingualism. 
They also claim to be free of politics as “the issue of preserving the Hungarian 
language is independent of any [political] party.” Their call for support includes some 
specific examples “Our goal cannot be achieved without widespread civic engagement. […] 
You already help a lot if next time when you go shopping you express disapproval of the lack 
of Hungarian signs or demand the book of complaints. […] You may also want to follow our 
Facebook page where you can contribute to the cause of bilingualism by sharing our content. 
If you engage in dispute, feel free to use the bilingual guide.”  
Referred to as “Milestones,” the Facebook page lists a number of achievements, 
predominantly “offline” precedents: 12 February 2012 “The Párkány project II”: On board of 
the AVALA international express train passing through the town of Érsekújvár [Nové 
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Zámky] and Párkány [Štúrovo] civilians informed passengers apart from Slovakian language, 
also in Hungarian, for the first time in history. 
• On 14 January 2012, in the framework of The Nameless Villages Project: KDSz-
activists registered 77 missing signs in the minority language in 34 settlements. 
• On 16 October 2011, in the context of The Dunaszerdahely Project, activists place the 
first bilingual traffic sign ever.  
• On 4 September 2011, as implementing “The Párkány [Štúrovo] project I,” civilians 
greeted passengers at the railway station for the first time in a number of decades in 
Hungarian and English languages.  
• On 1 August 2011, KDSz-activists placed bilingual stickers in a number of 
settlements.  
• On 30 May, the Facebook group counted 14,941 followers.  
In this case, although the listed developments rather reflect self-conscious references for 
digital representation than direct mobilizing functions per se, combined with other traits of 
digital activism described below, they indicate a lively interaction between the “offline” and 
“online” spheres. This hypothetically fulfills Neuman et al. (2011)’s following criteria: 1) the 
inclusion of a broad array of citizens in rational deliberation; 2) the capacity to influence the 
agenda of public discussion; 3) whether, once the attention is evident, the online environment 
facilitates rational critical discussion and the capacity for collective will formation; 4) 
discursive equality and reciprocal respect – the capacity in collective deliberation to evaluate 
arguments by their sincerity and persuasive strength rather than the status of the speaker; 5) 
the absence of a coercive external constraint on open discussion; 6) the absence of systematic 
distraction from political deliberation.  
My research found that recently, in correspondence with successful public law 
developments, the content shared attracted 208 reactions and 4 supportive comments on 
average per post, which were re-shared by follower approximately 12 times.   
Biggest feedback attracted was a post of 27 April in which 465 followers reacted to a 
photo of a bilingual sign at the railway station of Rimaszombat [Rimavská Sobota], with the 
caption: “Historical moment: first time ever since 1945, the railway station bears a Hungarian 
name!” 
Content regularly attracts significant attention of members, who insert positive “emoticons,” 
comment supportively, set out further goals and discuss them generally sharing a feeling of 
solidarity (cf. Neuman et al.’s criteria 1 and 3-4) and without coercive external constraints on 
open discussion (cf. Neuman et al.’s criterion 5) 
The repetitive slogan used by the group and its FB-page has been: “It's time to do 
more [than before].”  
Occasionally popular culture and Internet meme-based communication has appeared 
on the page, such as: “If there is no money for Hungarian signs, then why Hungarians have to 
pay taxes?” or “Making fun of my accent?” “I’m bilingual,” answers a laughing Di Caprio 
figure. Word games regularly caricature chauvinistic stance: Slovensko Slovákom Komárno 
Komárom.  
The page shares call for certain petitions in line with the profile of the page. Posts 
cover relevant issues of Hungarian language use from other parts of the Carpathian Basin, for 
example, comparing the status of Hungarian labels in stores of the Transylvania region of 
present-day Romania with that in Southern Slovakia. In addition, the page regularly 
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advertises institutions and events connected to Hungarian ethnic identities, such as the 
PMSZK Hungarian College in Bratislava and its calls for application for admission. The page 
also interacts with Hungarian language news organs, such as Parameter.sk, which latter 
categorizes itself as “the most visited Hungarian news portal in Slovakia” (cf. Neuman et al.’s 
criterion 2). 
Content reflected consistent bilingualism in the context of describing the group's 
profile and the majority of shared posts. The latter has been characterized by both a 
supranational and a regional outlook as “best practices” of other EU-Member States 
(Swedish-speaking population in Finland, Alto Adige, etc.) are often regarded as standards 
for evaluating developments, and Transylvania is also regularly considered a reference point 
for the movement   
However, such manifestations of ethnocentrism do not necessarily mean that the 
group is exclusive or aims to confront on the grounds of ethnic identity. Accordingly, the 
FM-page of KDSz emphasizes in a bilingual statement that there is no problem with the use 
of the Slovak language, nor do they intend to undermine the rights of those who use the 
Slovak language in any way. Rather, what they want to achieve is the full bilingualism. Even 
the name itself “Kétnyelvű Dél-Szlovákia – Dvojjazyčné Južné Slovensko” and other page 
profile descriptions are consequently bilingual (cf. Neuman et al.’s criterion 6). 
Thus, the page has managed to convey an ethos and a sense of mission that 
contributes to the maintenance of social identity of followers and to the preservation of the 
commitment of group members, and also to increase the number of followers. According to 
the findings of an anonymous survey based on 11 questions2 among internet users, from 
whom 90.6% are ethnic Hungarians from Southern Slovakia. Most followers of the page visit 
                                                 
2 Questions and results of the survey in detail: 1. How regularly do you follow the FB-page of Bilingual South 
Slovakia and its shared contents? a) on a daily basis (13,2%); b) not on a daily basis, but rather often (49.9%) c) 
occasionally, when notified (31,5%); d) other (5.4%) 2. How important is that Hungarian language in used 
publicly in Southern Slovakia? a) it has a special significance (83,8%); b) is rather important (16,2%); 3. Does 
the Hungarian identity matter to you personally? a) it has a special significance (83,8%); b) is rather important 
(16,2%); c) non-impiortant (0%). 4. Which tools can be the most viable in favour of promoting bilingualism in 
Southern Slovakia? a) Previous tools used by KDSz, such as placing stickers, giving information in Hungarian 
on public transport, etc. (48,6%); (b) combining peaceful online and offline forms of protest (40,5%); c) civil 
disobedience (2,6%); (d) other (8,3%), including: political steps (4,1%), more radical steps (such as the 
destruction of Slovak labels, open confrontation with persons or institutions who violate the law) (0 %); using 
Hungarian language even on Facebook (4,1%) 5. What tools of those being at the disposable of the KDSz can 
contribute the most to ensuring bilingualism? a) organising demonstrations, flashmobs (57,1%); b) compilation 
of online petitions (2,7%); c) raising awareness with legitimate online guerrilla methods (e.g. placing links on 
other sites) (37,1%); d) other (3,1%); 6. Do you plan to be present at events related to the site's goals in the 
future? a) Of course, since it is a key issue for me (5,1%); b) Yes, if I have the opportunity (35,9%); c) No, 
online support for this site is sufficient (35,9%); d) No (23,1%) 7. Do you speak the Slovak language? a) Yes 
(84,4%); b) I can get myself understood and read (6,2%); c) I speak, but I do not use it on principle (0%); d) No 
(9,4%). 8. Does the attitude of the Slovak state toward the use of Hungarian language disturb you? a) yes, 
absolutely (34,4%); b) I have been experiencing improvement lately, but it still irritates me (43,8%); c) Does not 
bother that much, as one can understand also their position in this regard (15,6%); d) does not bother (6,2%). 9. 
What is your relationship with Slovakia, the Slovak people and culture? a) hostile, after all they are "dumb tót" 
and "I am older than Slovakia to begin with" (5,1%); b) I do not like them because of historical trauma and a 
hostile state behavior (10,1%); c) I have no problem with them as ”they are also human beings”, however, some 
state policies indeed disturb me (78,1%); d) I like them because of their similar historic trajectory and mentality 
and understand their state’s attitude (6,7%). 10. Do you get informed about the status of ethnic Hungarian 
people and language in Southern Slovakia? a) only through news and also conveyed by KDSz (6,3%); b) apart 
from KDSz, also from other Hungarian language news sites (25%); c) both from Hungarian and Slovakian news 
sources (53,1%); d) I don’t get informed (15,6%). 11. Where do you come from? a) From the Hungarian parts of 
Upper Hungary, in current-day Southern Slovakia (90,6%); b) from Hungary proper (9,4%); c) Other (0%). 
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the KDSz-page rather often; consider the public use of Hungarian language to be of crucial 
importance; attribute to Hungarian identity special significance; consider previous tools used 
by KDSz (such as placing stickers, giving information in Hungarian on public transport, etc.) 
and combining peaceful online and offline forms of protest viable in favor of promoting 
bilingualism in Southern Slovakia. The majority believes that organizing demonstrations, 
flash mobs, and compiling online petitions can contribute to achieving the goal of 
bilingualism; plan to be present at “offline” events if have the opportunity and/or consider 
online tools in this regard enough; have no problem with Slovakia, Slovakian people and 
language as “they are also human beings,” however, find some state policies indeed 
disturbing. Apart from KDSz, they also tend to get informed about the status of ethnic 
Hungarian people and language in Southern Slovakia by other Hungarian and Slovakian 
language news sites.  
Apparently, ethnic identity, with a sense of belonging that is inscribed in the 
institutional and political, as well as everyday life beyond the online sphere, is a determining 
factor for the KDSz-group. The experience of KDSz suggests that even if “homogeneous” 
content circulates within an online group (cf. Sunstein’s vision of the echo chambers), this 
does not necessarily imply isolation or hostile attitude toward others. Neither does it mean 
that the group tolerates or ad absurdum encourages such behavior among its members. The 
concept of cyber-balkanization, or at least the term per se, suggests separatism and/or 
prejudice against or hostility toward outsiders or rival groups as the term coins the 
combination of cyberspace with Balkans, a political region in southeastern Europe with a 
history of partitioned cultures, languages, and religion, and even more importantly, 
ethnically-based conflicts and wars in the early ’90s. This does not seem to be the case here.     
Consequently, online activities of KDSz can well be understood as political 
participation based on a pure sense of belonging (i.e., self-categorization within a group; cf: 
Turner et al. 1987) rather than being an echo chamber (Sunstein, 2009) or merely a 
movement promoted in line with self-congratulatory poses of ICT-imperialism (Aouragh, 
2012). In addition, findings confirm de facto political engagement untied to political factors 
used for oppression (Morozov 2011), and lastly, online activities have constantly been 
compatible with Neuman et al. (2011)’s criteria (findings are shown in Table 1).  
In fact it seems evident that in particular Neuman et al.’s following criteria were met: 
1) the inclusion of a broad array of citizens in rational deliberation; and 2) the capacity to 
influence the agenda of public discussion; were met without any 5) coercive external 
constraints on open discussion or 6) systematic distraction from political deliberation.  
All this suggests that a public sphericule has been formed where the common identity 
has been reproduced in the online sphere, by a digital media social networking site without 
necessarily turning into an echo chamber (cf. Sunstein, 2009).  
 
 
The Igazi Csíki Sör case – Szekler identity and transnational politico-economic interests 
 
Although links to a form of political economy cannot be excluded, especially that the topic 
has recently reached state-level and political agendas, one can also draw important lessons 
from social engagement patterns of another “regional” case, namely digital media activities 
surrounding a beer producer rivalry in Transylvania (current-day Romania). This paper 
predominantly focuses on the social mobilization dimension of the series of events and 
results related to (self-)categorization (McKinley et al., 2014; Turner et al., 1987) driven 
digital media use in light of documented online activity.  
In the course of its business-related rivalry and conflict, and the accompanying legal 
action initiated on the grounds of alleged infringement of intellectual property, unfair 
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competition and trade violations, Dutch multinational corporation Heineken has publicly 
questioned the geographic and cultural existence of Székely Land (or Szeklerland, a historic 
and ethnographic area in Romania, inhabited by an ethnic Hungarian majority).  
On 20 January 2015, a Facebook group entitled ’Let’s boycott Heineken products’ 
[Bojkottáljuk a Heineken termékeket] was launched.  
By the end of July 2015, the number of people joining the group reached more than 11 
thousand. They called for boycotting Heineken’s products as “[Heineken] not only desires to 
have the factory “Igazi Csíki Sör” closed down, but what’s more, recently the Hungarophobe 
Heineken also questions the existence of Székely Land. This comes close to extremely 
chauvinist Noua Dreapta’s communication who refer to it as “Asa-zis Tinutul Secuiesc.”  
Although the group’s page has not been available since 2015, it offers some lessons both for 
digital media experts and scholars, especially together with another page with overlapping 
supposed motivations and patterns of digital media use as will be seen below.  Not 
necessarily spontaneous or grassroots, as an online collective action aimed to explicitly 
demonstrate solidarity with a beer manufacturer in its rivalry vis-a-vis Heineken portraying in 
this regard as an “underdog” or “David against the multinational Goliath,” another Facebook-
page, entitled “Forbidden Beer from Csík” [Tiltott Csíki Sör], was launched somewhat earlier 
before (11 December 2014) than the online call for a boycott. At the time of finishing this 
paper [on 29 September], it counts 76,412 followers.  
Again, partly similarly to the case of the KDSz-page, content analysis of relevant 
posts and page feedback was carried out, accompanied by an evaluation of relevant statistics 
on the induced reaction. My research found that in the early days (more precisely: between 11 
December 2014 until 26 December 2014), its posts provoked limited feedback and collected 
an average of 63 likes, 2 comments and less than 19 shares per content.  
Later on (i.e., between 15 May and 28 May 2017) feedback figures numbered an average of 
721 reactions, 15 comments and 77 re-shares per content.  
The following shared post is an epitome of the conveyed narrative: “The struggle of a 
beer manufacturer from Csíkszentsimon [Sânsimion] with MNC Heineken: shall the multi-
billionaire capital be victorious?” 
The second (“Forbidden beer from Csík”) page uses a motto attributed to Frank Zappa 
on several occasions: “you can't be a real country unless you have a beer and an airline. It 
helps if you have some kind of a football team or some nuclear weapons, but at the very least 
you need a beer.” 
Regardless of evident political and arguably politico-economic aspects and 
corresponding marketing-related activities, the group managed to raise constant awareness 
including that of mainstream (traditional) media outlets (cf. Neuman et al.’s criterion 2).  
Regionally widespread news outlets such as Maszol.ro (Transylvania/Romania) and 
Mandiner.hu (Hungary) also covered the issue and mentioned the online activism in some 
articles with catchy titles such as “The Székelys have declared war on Heineken” and “Here’s 
an everyday beer, what a pity it’s not available at home [Hungary]” on 21 January 2017 and 
12 May 2015, respectively.  
While playing on social identification driven (cf. McKinley, 2014; Turner et al., 1987) 
psychological stimuli, namely the Szekler identity and self-esteem, the group posted nearly 
on a daily basis stereotypical content related to internet memes, “Székely jokes” and initiates 
international campaigns of representing the disadvantaged brand Tiltott Csíki Sör.  
Shared content although biased to a certain extent and provocative, has remained open 
for discussion (cf. Neuman 2011 et al.’s criteria 1, 3-4). Arguably, the online engagement 
was utilized by and/or met a business interest in the overlapping objective of promoting a 
Székely Land-based brand identity and at the same time to negatively affect Heineken beer 
giant’s business as an answer. Consequently, while business interests were served in terms of 
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ventilating a brand identity, group affiliation of members has also been strengthened. 
Although from a different perspective based on a different case, these patterns again indicate 
similarly to KDSz that although in a way group polarization can be manifested in online 
social networking platforms, this neither necessarily induces echo chambers or hate speech 
(cf. Sunstein, 2009).    
Summarized and evaluated on the basis of Neuman et al. (2011) criteria, the Let’s 
Boycott Heineken page thus allowed the 1) inclusion of a broad array of citizens in rational 
deliberation, although somewhat biased vis-a-vis Heineken, and to a lesser extent, also gave 
room to 2) capacities to influence the agenda of public discussion. In this case, the online 
environment arguably, although not necessarily 3) facilitated rational critical discussion and 
the capacity for collective will formation, where at least in theory, 4) discursive equality and 
reciprocal respect was also provided although echo-chamber effects (cf. Sunstein, 2002) 
might have made content one-sided. 5) The absence of a coercive external constraint on open 
discussion and 6) the absence of systematic distraction from political deliberation 
undoubtedly characterized the mechanisms (findings are shown in Table 1 on page34). 
Eventually on 27 March 2017, HEINEKEN announced officially that Romania and Lixid 
Project SRL intend to settle their ongoing dispute 
As published on its official website, HEINEKEN Romania, and S.C. Lixid Project 
SRL are pleased to announce that following ongoing and constructive conversations they 
both intend to settle their dispute about the Csiki Sor brand-name. 
As part of the settlement, HEINEKEN Romania gives consent to Lixid Project SRL 
for the coexistence of the Ciuc and Csiki brand names and agrees that Lixid Project SRL 
market the Csiki Sör beer. As a result of this agreement, both parties will abandon all legal 
activities related to the commercial dispute. 
The settlement involves compromises on both sides, and it allows both companies to 
continue building their relationship with their consumers, employees, business partners and 
the local community. Both companies now look forward to leaving their past differences 
behind them and focusing on what they do best and enjoy most: brewing beer (Heineken, 
2017).  
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Table 1: Assessment of experiences 
Criteria for a successful online public 
sphere 
















1) the inclusion of a broad array of 
citizens in rational deliberation; 
yes yes 
2) the capacity to influence the 
agenda of public discussion; 
yes yes 
3) the online environment 
facilitates rational critical 
discussion and the capacity for 
collective will formation; 
not necessarily not necessarily 
4) discursive equality and 
reciprocal respect – the 
capacity in collective 
deliberation to evaluate 
arguments by their sincerity and 
persuasive strength rather than 
the status of the speaker; 
not necessarily  not necessarily 
5) the absence of a coercive 
external constraint on open 
discussion; 
yes yes 
6) the absence of systematic 






Taken into consideration that hegemonic optimistic and pessimistic models have arguably 
always led to the reductive interpretation of the complex reality of digital media’s social 
functions, I sought to identify the objective foundations or ultimate grounds of the social 
mobilizing potential within digital media thus advocating a balanced view in line with earlier 
research (e.g., Habermas, 2006; Boyd, 2008; Papacharissi, 2010; Neuman, 2011; van Dijck, 
2012; Fuchs, 2014).  
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Such a dialectic approach which I venture to name digital realism does not deny that politico-
economics, (geo)politics-based and social criticism and the corresponding pessimistic 
arguments are relevant when discussing digital media, rather it collides them with optimistic 
digital premises in order to realize this claimed nuanced approach at hand. Thus, my 
hypothesis has been that under certain conditions, digital media does indeed form 
sociopolitical frameworks where the Neuman et al. (2011) criteria of understanding an 
alternative public sphere could also be arguably met, while realities of large-scale politico-
economic and international power-related structures and agendas are also present, that limit 
this alternative public sphere in its scope.  
Such anchored postulates determine a balanced view that led me to distinguish 
between different environments.  
I have found the idea of focusing on online activities of small local or regional, ethnic 
identity-based online movements which either involve political action aimed at citizenship 
(KDSz) or express solidarity (Let’s Boycott Heineken) when evaluating digital optimism and 
pessimism profoundly appealing as my intention has been to avoid falling into the trap of 
approaching these means exclusively in an either optimistic or pessimistic manner. 
This idea seemed logical toed in terms of supporting claims of mobilization potential 
within digital media while also acknowledging of course that in some sense politico-
economic (Aouragh, 2012) and/or social criticism is indeed needed when discussing their 
social functions. 
Moreover, it has seemed to provide a way of making sense of the essentially valid 
points of digital optimism’s premises of a public sphere while taking the context of social 
variables with regard to dynamic politics/economy-related and other aspects seriously, which 
altogether allowed to consistently remain on digital realist grounds.  
In other words, the question that arises is not whether digital media can serve as a tool 
for political participation, but rather, 1) whether such existing qualities of these services and 
applications can counterbalance those already identified (cf. i.e., Morozov, 2011; Aouragh, 
2012; Nashif, 2017) and 2) whether such online activism constitutes or paves the way for 
audience fragmentation and isolation (Sunstein, 2009). 
Experiences of KDSz and “Let’s boycott Heineken’s products!”/ “Forbidden Beer 
from Csík” give an insight into the fine nuances of the use of digital media. These events and 
facts could not only serve the public sphere debate where arguably Neuman et al. (2011) 
standards can be a useful benchmark from which to evaluate them, but also show interesting 
aspects of self-categorization-related ethnic identity of communities and the corresponding 
emergence of public sphericules which are in this case online rather than popular media-
based (cf. Cunningham, 2001) and not necessarily to be considered echo chambers (cf. 
Sunstein, 2009) Thus, as for the questions above, this paper refutes the premise of the second 
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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine whether the media language code is 
suitable for transmitting religious messages. In religious media communication one 
observes a tendency not to respect the classical news values, and in fact tends to limit 
them. This approach makes religious media communication fail at the start. Using 
textual analysis and qualitative research techniques, e.g., focus groups and Delphi, we 
investigate some news values relate (positively or negatively) to the religious messages. 
Here we present three most expressive of them: conflict, scandalousness and story. If 
messages are formed by news values, then religious messages are formed by means of 
values that we named the gospel values, and can be identified with traditional Catholic 
Church virtues. Finding possible connections between the news values and the gospel 
values seems to be one of the basic solutions for the religious message media coding.  
 






Can media language carry religious content? This fundamental question has been the subject 
of our wide research inspired by previous projects carried out at the Department focusing on 
the coverage of religious topics in the media. Previous projects have pointed to an interesting 
fact that the news coverage of identical topics by the religious media has sharply contrasted 
with that of secular media, even to the extent that an almost “intersection-free” set of the 
underlying facts communicated by the media could be observed. The products of such 
coverage fall into two extremes: the non-journalistically covered and, from the recipient’s 
perspective, almost indigestible reviews of religious events brought by religious media – and 
handy and journalistically covered, however completely without the true essence of the event 
by secular media.  For instance, the religious media covered the news about the Pope’s visit 
to a foreign country through reviews of the Pope’s homilies and addresses while secular 
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media focused on pilgrims, hotel managers, gift shop sellers, construction of the viewing 
stands, and a variety of specific issues only partially related to the visit such as Church 
scandals and controversies, especially sex scandals, relations with Jews or other Christian 
denominations, financing and disestablishment. 
This observation has prompted the question as to whether the causes of such 
differences were objective or subjective in their nature, i.e. whether they are inevitable, or if a 
kind of systemic flaw resides therein. Since this study focuses specifically on the problem of 
communication code in media transmission of religious messages, the question subject to 
examination is how the inherent qualities of a media communication code affect the 
transmission of religious messages, on one hand, and how do such religious messages cope 
with the inherent qualities of media communication codes when transmitted through these 
communication channels.  
In our examination of the capacity of media language code to transmit religious2 
messages, we will focus on the communication process, or, the communication process of 
mass media in particular. The generally accepted scheme transmitter – code – channel – noise 
– recipient is present in each communication process. As part of our research of the media 
code, which forms the basis of our further investigation, we have focused on the transmission 
part of the scheme, i. e. the code – channel – noise, in particular, and here, we have arrived at 
several key findings about the code, which are presented below.  
This study deals with concepts such as religious message, religious media, or secular 
media, in particular. The term ‘religious message’ refers to a piece of communication 
originating in the church environment, which a communicator seeks to spread using a 
medium. The concept of religious media is broader than the church media – it not only 
includes media owned by the church, but also private media which position themselves as 




State of the art 
 
Institutional Framework  
 
More comprehensive research studies of the relation between religion and media date back to 
the 1980s. A relatively small circle of scholars who explored the subject have managed to 
establish several specialised institutes devoted to scholarly research and public debate on 
these issues – among others the Centre for Religion and Media at New York University, 
Centre for Religion and Society at University of Amsterdam, or Centre for Media, Religion 
and Culture at University of Colorado.  
The academic debate on this subject is also taking place in printed journals such as 
Journal of Media and Religion or Journal of Culture and Religion. 
 A thoughtful discussion on the subject takes place during the International 
Conferences of Media, Religion and Culture (ICMRC) held in various parts of the world 
since 1994. The first conference was held in Uppsala, Sweden, and the 7th session was held in 
2010 in Toronto, Canada. Last year the participants to the conference have established a 
common scientific association led by Stewart M. Hoover from University of Colorado, who 
is also the director of the Center for Media, Religion and Culture established in 2006 at the 
School of Journalism and Mass Communication at University of Colorado in Boulder, the 
organising entity of the conferences.  
 Three interesting collective works have been published so far from the conferences: 
Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture (eds. Stewart M. Hoover and Knut Lundby, 1997), 
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Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media (eds. Stewart M. Hoover and Lynn Schofield 
Clark, 1997) and Mediating Religion: Studies in Media, Religion, and Culture (eds. Jolyon 




In 2008, the editors of Journal of Media and Religion identified the following three key areas 
of research into religion and media:   
 
1. proliferation of mediated religion (media create multiple places of worship beyond 
the physical walls of traditional congregations), 
2. religious audiences as interpretive communities (shared interpretations of popular 
media content are increasingly important in understanding religious groups), 
3. media criticism (critiquing media genres and texts). (Stout and Buddenbaum, 
2008, p. 226) 
 
This classification can be accepted, however, for the purpose of our research, it needs to be 
extended as follows:   
 
1) mediated religion  
a) religious impact of media  
b) religion as media  
      2)  media criticism  
a) relation between sacred and profane 
b) anti-religious prejudice in media 
c) media approach to new religious movements  
 3) religious media audience. 
 
Religious Impact of Media 
 
Khojaste and Kalantari (2009) dealt with the philosophical account of the relation between 
religion and media and distinguished two opposite media approaches: instrumentalist 
approach (positive: media can be used) and essentialist approach (negative: there is an abyss 
between media and religion). The integrated approach can be regarded as a compromise 
between the above two positions (complementary functions of traditional and modern media  
to attain religious objectives) as developed by Bahonar (2009). 
 Stolow (2005) insists that it is the media, which provide a platform for new forms of 
religious publicity in non-religious dominant public spheres, such as religious counter-public 
(an alternative regardless of the state and civil systems) and split-public (dialogical symbiosis 
of societies with different cultural backgrounds). The editors of the collection of essays 
Religion, Media and the Public Sphere Meyer a Moors (2006) present the idea of the so-
called mediated religion, which constructs new forms of civil discussion and public 
discourse.  
 Several scholars examined the problem of media in the hands of religious 
fundamentalists. The rise of fundamentalism enhanced by media was proved by Murdock 
(1997). Thomas (2008) analysed the communication strategies of Christian fundamentalists 
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Religion as Media 
 
The idea of identifying religion with the media instead of examining parallel functions of 
religion as a distinct phenomenon from media is strongly supported Stolow (2005). Stolow 
supports the idea of sensuous religious presence (religion materialised through human 
senses). In 2008, this was subject of a special edition of Material Religion. Meyer (2008), the 
editor of the journal, concludes that religion builds bridges between man and transcendence, 
whereby man overcomes the distance between those two. In that process religion makes the 
image of transcendence complete and shapes it. Analogically, media give a material form to 
the transcendence.  
Common media functions of religion and mass media were also examined by De la 
Cruz (2009) who points out that in certain situations religion and media even change their 




Sacrum and Profanum 
 
The myth that media are agents of secularisation is denied by most scholars. Stolow (2005) 
insists that scholars should seek a deeper and more profound understanding of the relation 
between religion and media. De la Cruz (2009) provides an alternative in the theory of 
‘convergent media’ – binary categories of secular and religious, which drive contemporary 
ethnography and social theory,”.  
In his content analysis Silk (1995) states the following two key arguments: (1) the 
hypothesis of secularisation role of the media was not proved and (2) there exist socially 
constructed moral categories, which are also accepted by journalists. He calls them 
conventionalised story types and identifies them with the topoi taken from classical rhetorical 
theory. For religious topics, these story types express certain moral attitudes. Silk outlines 
seven story types: good works, tolerance, hypocrisy, false prophecy, inclusion, supernatural 
belief, declension. The ancient Greek topoi, as a category of commonly shared ideas, is 
examined by González Gaitano (2009) and Rončáková (2010) as part of their research into 
religion and media. 
 Hoover and Venturelli (1996) both suggest that scholars should refrain from trying to 
draw a demarcation line between secular and religious, and that they should see media as 
fundamentally ‘religious’. Here, secularism is perceived as any other ritualised system of 
imaging and these two authors attempt to unearth its fundamental religiosity. 
  
 
Media Bias Against Religion 
 
The view that journalists approach religious topics with a bias is supported by Zasępa (2003). 
He provides several reasons for preconceptions on the part of journalists against religion: 
pseudo-liberalism, cynicism, consumerism, control and complexity. A chasm of 
misunderstanding and ignorance separates journalists and church leaders, as concluded by 
Dart and Allen (1993). According to these two scholars however the tension between religion 
leaders and the press is more the result of ignorance about how to handle religion stories than 
any antagonism toward religion per se. Other scholars find news values the cause of the lack 
of media interest in religious activities of Christians. For instance, Winston (2007) argues that 
social activities of Christian leftists are regarded as natural, continuous and not newsworthy. 
Absence of specialised religious editors is regarded one of the main drawbacks of secular 
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media in their approach to religious topics (Shupe, 1994; Wright, 1997, p. 106). 
 Shupe (1997) argues that media ‘framing’ of religious organisations provides an index 
of acculturation and control over valuable resources, such as the access to news production 
that shapes the organisation’s public image. Contreras (2007) also identifies some general 
beliefs related to topoi behind individual frames related to the way the secular press informs 
about the Catholic Church. Gazda (2009) specialises in media framing of the events in 
Vatican, and compares their coverage of secular and religious periodicals. He blames secular 
media for inconsistent verification of information, superficiality, tabloidisation and 
promotion of negativity. For Gazda, religious media are susceptible to buck-passing, lack of 
professionalism and inferior-quality output marked by inconsistencies, positive bias and 
focus on message. 
 
 
New Religious Movements  
 
Wright (1997, p. 104), the editor of a special edition of Review of Religious Research on this 
topic, confirms the presence of media bias against minority religions and provides six related 
factors: (1) journalists’ knowledge or familiarity with subject matter, (2) the degree of 
cultural accommodation of the targeted religious group, (3) economic resources available to 
journalists, (4) time constraints of journalists, (5) journalists’ sources of information, (6) the 
front-end/back-end disproportionality of reporting. Wright arrives at the key conclusion that 
media are allies of anti-cult organisations. Richardson and van Driel (1997) uses a rather 
offensive rhetoric and blames media for favouring ideologically dominant status quo and 
discrediting of differentiated groups. Hill, Hickman and McLendon (2001) argue that media 
are much more critical of NRM than the established churches (Catholic, Protestant), they 
overemphasise their (often putative) violent nature, whereby they, to some extent and almost 
prophetically, impose such an image on these groups. 
Defense of journalists based on natural attributes of journalism as a profession can be 
found in Silk (1997), Dart (1997) or Buddenbaum (1998). 
Hoover and Clark (1997) suggest that media treatment of controversial religions is not 
simply a uniform conduit for the status quo, but a public forum for the playing out of a social 




Religious Media Audience  
 
The authors of Religion and Mass Media: Audiences and Adaptations, edited by Stout 
and Buddenbaum (1996) are regarded as pioneers of research into media content audience. 
Four empirical studies on the comparative use of media across Christian traditions explain 
how audience members respond to and then practice their religious directives. The authors 
conclude that regardless of institutional directives, media plays a very important role in the 
everyday lives of religious audiences. 
 Khojaste and Kalantari (2009) ask one of the key questions of the research into 
relation between religion and media: How can religious matters be addressed in the public 
media, so as to be able to involve a passive audience that is supposedly not the addressee of 
the message, and turn him or her into an active audience? They suggest that the answer can 
be found in the so-called religious media rituals. 
 
 




The main question of our research was whether the religious messages are transportable by 
media, or, stated differently, whether the media language is suitable for the transmission of 
religious messages.  
The answer to this question rests on the application of the method of quantitative 
content analysis (Gunter, 2000, p. 55-70), qualitative audience research methods based on 
focus groups (Hornig Priest, 1996, p. 109-113) and the Delphi method (De Blasio et al., 
2007, p. 122). An analysis of the content will be conducted by the method of monitoring the 
frames3 (Contreras, 2007) and topoi (González Gaitano, 2008) on a sample of selected Slovak 
and Italian media. A part of the research is in development, and its aim is to identify which 
groups of topics (frames), or commonly shared ideas (topoi) that are used in covering 
religious events in the individual types of media, and what the media is seeking to appeal to 
in the recipient’s mind, and also, what can be learned to carry religious content through 
media more efficiently. The focus groups were composed of both lay recipients and media 
experts within various groups across Slovakia. Results are based on how the respondents 
perceived the coverage of religious content in church and secular media, what they found 
missing or disturbing, where they saw a potential for improvement, and what causes they 
could identify.  
The above addresses the very basic structure of the research: the analysis of the 
mediated religious message and the system of transmission, i.e. the media communication 
itself. As per classical media theories, media communication comprises the source, channel, 
code, external input and the recipient.  
The following passage presents the conclusions of the research of the communication 
code based on qualitative audience research using Delphi and focus group methods. 
According to M. Sorice (De Blasio et al., 2007, p. 122), Delphi method was originally 
developed for technological and military purposes in the 1950s by Olaf Helmer and Norman 
Dalkey. Apart from the preliminary analyses, the originally planned area of application, this 
method was also used in other fields. As a result, several variants of this method have 
evolved. In general, this method is regarded as a tool, which can effectively contribute to 
finding solutions to complex problems. At the core of this method is the effort to initiate 
fruitful discussion within a group of experts, and, at the same time, eliminate potential 
interference among the individual members of the group. 
Focus groups represent a favorite qualitative research method. As pointed by 
B. Gunter, its proponents argue that this method has “higher ecological validity” than 
quantitative questionnaire or experiment-based methods (Gunter, 2000, p. 46). However, in 
our research, laypersons were given less room than experts since our main goal was to 
identify how the internal processes actually work and what are the causes behind them, rather 
than to gather information about the prevailing opinions of consumers. Thus, when setting up 
the focus groups, we focused on consumers representing that part of the continuum4, which 
corresponded to an active audience prepared to critically reflect upon the issues raised, or 
even actively contribute to the respective media content.   
The focus groups were set up to include both experts and lay consumers. Since our 
primary goal was to enhance the “depth” of discussions, the total number of discussion 
groups was relatively small. As part of our research, we created ten discussion groups, most 
of them composed of experts (seven). As a complement, a smaller number of discussion 
groups (three) were formed from ordinary consumers 
When setting up focus groups we targeted recipients of media content familiarized 
with both secular and church media, especially those interested in religious messages. 
Therefore, we were looking for candidates from among the group of believers interested in 
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current developments in media, during the topically-oriented public events we organized in 
two Slovak towns, Nitra and Ružomberok, in February and March 2009. Young people 
formed a majority in two research groups, and the third group was mixed. The number of 
people in the groups ranged from three to fifteen. 
The Delphi technique was applied to seven discussion groups of experts. The 
discussions were conducted from May 2008 to May 2009 in Slovakia (Bratislava, 
Ružomberok, Nitra), but also in the Czech Republic (Prague) and Italy (Rome). There were 
two research meetings held both in Nitra and Prague, with the attendance of journalists from 
various secular and church media engaged in the religious topics, academics active in 
journalism from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Russia, and from other 
European countries, employees of the Catholic academic journalistic institutions from 
Europe, Asia, USA and Africa, experienced media experts cooperating with the Department 
of Journalism of the Philosophical Faculty at the Catholic University in Ružomberok, and 
those interested in the church media developments. The number of attendants of the 
discussion groups ranged from eight to twenty.  
An identical set of questions was asked in both focus and expert groups – ordered and 
developed based on specific circumstances and context. The key question was as to whether 
the media language is suitable for the transmission of religious messages. Other related 
questions were as follows:  
 
- What is the relation of secular media towards religious topics? What is the 
determining factor of their relation?  
- What are the aims of journalism and religion?  
- What instruments can be employed to attain such aims in journalism and religion?  
- What values are at stake within journalism and religion?  
- Is there a match between religious values and news values? 
- Is this a question of professionalism?  
- Is an evangelization medium a journalistic institution?  
- Is it possible to reasonably inform the public about religious topics (and under what 
conditions)? 
- Is a full-scope evangelization through media possible?  
- How successful are evangelization media?  
- What are the weaknesses of secular media in relation to religious messages?  
- What are the weaknesses of the church media in relation to professional journalism? 
- Is a shift in this area possible, and if yes, what are its limits? 
 
The discussions were conducted in accordance with the rules applicable to individual 
methods. There were audio recordings and written records made during the discussions. The 
information obtained was subsequently made subject to interpretation. As part of the 
reduction of the obtained information we applied the method of summarization of meaning 
and the method of categorization (De Blasio et al. 2007, p. 92-93). This means that we 
synthesized the key thoughts contained in the answers of the interviewed persons, and 
subsequently categorized them into specific topical areas. Then we looked for certain 
similarities or affinities within the individual areas, which could then be aggregated into 
distinct categories. We identified 34 such categories, which combined the individual features 
of the system of media communication in relation to the transmission of religious messages. 
These categories were then organized into several groups based on whether they pertained to 
the media language code, media communication code, or external inputs. Thus, we arrived at 
12 categories related to the language code, 9 categories related to the transmission channel, 
and 13 categories related to external inputs.  
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Table 1: Categories identified 
 
 Code Channel External inputs 
1. News values Function of journalism Prejudice 
2. Conflict Commerciality Faith 
3. Scandal Internal motivation Communicators 
4. Entertainment, leisure Technical conditions Journalists’ professionalism 
5. 
Fragmented and flashy 
nature 
Democratic nature, public Investment in people 
6. Stereotypes Agenda setting Strategy 





9. Transmission of essence Church media specifics Truth and dialogue 
10. Quality vs superficial  Authority 
11. Language  Stance 
12. Awareness about audience  Journalists’ profile 
13.   




Each of the research method used is qualitative in its nature, which means that the research 
procedure does not follow the traditional quantitative pattern: the formulation of hypotheses, 
verification of the hypotheses, description of status, and confirmation / falsification of the 
hypotheses. Our approach follows a different pattern: perception and understanding, 
description of status, and formulation of hypotheses (De Blasio et al., 2007, p. 49). Therefore, 
a substantial difference can be observed between these two approaches: while the quantitative 
research leads to confirmation or falsification of the hypotheses, and, as a consequence, 
includes rather normative and self-confident conclusions, the qualitative research on the other 
hand arrives at the point where the quantitative research has begun, i. e. the formulation of 
the hypotheses. Thus, the conclusions of the qualitative research attempt to contribute to 
finding a solution to a given subject and they are formulated with much greater caution and 
responsiveness to new findings and impulses.  
At the heart of our research was the endeavor to obtain the most authentic 
understanding or insight into the system of media communication of religious messages, or, 
stated differently, to conduct an ethnographic observation. The material presented herein 





News values and gospel values 
 
Classical news values may be regarded as the first and most important feature of media code. 
This is what makes a piece of news worth its name. In a broader sense, this is what makes a 
journalistic material worth its name. To put it bluntly, that is what allows a piece of 
information to enter the process of selection, coverage and disclosure of news.  
As clear from Delphi expert groups, the answer to the question about the 
presumptions journalists have before they decide to cover a religious topic is surprisingly 
simple: it is the very same presumption they have in respect of other topics, including a sieve 
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of news values. Thus, the deeply rooted understanding of the existence of prejudice is put in 
question. This topic would also deserve a more detailed examination, however, obviously, it 
cannot be discussed as part of inherent features of the media code.  
There is a tendency to anticipate journalists’ prejudice against religious topics, however, the 
lack of interest might have different causes, for example, a limited offer of journalistically 
unattractive topics. 
 And this does not pertain only to religious topics. “Politicians, big companies, public 
administration, all of them feel discontented,“ said František Múčka, editor of Trend, an 
economic weekly. The problem also stems from the fact that external communicators, 
including those within the church mistakenly identify their own view of attractiveness and 
significance of a topic with that of the public. Or, at the opposite extreme, they completely 
underestimate the importance of attractiveness and significance of a topic, and try to draw 
attention to an institution, person, etc. by means of a news message, which, however, may 
contain little or no information value. Despite public relations represent an important source 
of information for journalists (Hejlová, 2015, p. 106), church spokespersons are often unable 
to provide information in attractive form for media. And thus journalists receive news of a 
pilgrimage, for instance, which details names of preachers or organizers, and provides 
extensive accounts of the weather, but which, at the same time, lacks any single important 
thought from the homily, or some basic information such as the number of participants, 
history of the covered event, not to speak about the focus of this year’s event. If a journalist 
lacks personal involvement and good will to publish important pieces of information, and 
does not make a phone call to the respective parish to obtain the missing piece of 
information, such a news message cannot end up anywhere else than in the dustbin.  
Thus, news values are ‘rules of the profession’, the understanding and acceptance of 
which cannot be avoided.  Does a religious message also contain these values? This is a key 
question when examining the capacity of media language to transmit religious messages.  
News value is what makes a journalistic material worth its name. Religious message 
can only be though of as religious messages, if they incorporate values based on the aim and 
mission of Christian religion as such – i .e to preach God’s love of man and encourage people 
to answer to God’s calling and form a personal relation with God. This is the aim of the 
church attained mainly through personal testimonies (personal proclamation of one’s 
experience with God and the unfolding of personal relation with God). To preserve the very 
essence of a religious message, the news message must contain something of this experience 
with God and His love and his presence in human life, which, then, translates into values we 
may call gospel values, and which can be identified with classical Christian virtues (love, 
justice, faith, solidarity, forgiveness, etc.)5.  
Are gospel values completely different than news values – or can intersections be 
found? Our research suggests that intersections can be found, however, it is far more difficult 
to find them in information based on gospel news values than in mere news values lying on 
the surface of conflicts, scandals, deviations, or some extravagant pieces of the elite. To 
present fidelity or forgiveness attractively requires more effort and a more intense and deeper 
immersion in the topic. “It takes more professionalism,“ concludes Diego Contreras, 
consulted as part of our research, Dean at the Faculty of Social Institutional Communications 
of the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome. “It is easier to appeal to instincts and 
instinctual drives, it is easier to descend than ascend. Therefore, a Christian journalist must be 
better.”6 The Chairman of the Pontifical Council for Social Communications, Claudio Maria 
Celli, has provided his insight during the conference about today’s challenges faced by 
journalists organized by the Council: “To be a Catholic journalist is far more demanding than 
to be a common journalist, as this requires a greater responsibility,“7. He has also specified 
three things that make a responsible Catholic journalist: to achieve high technical quality, 
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mediate the Teaching of the Church, and be able to engage in a true dialogue with the world. 
According to C. M. Celli, the capacity to enter in a true dialogue with the world requires 
openness to all parties, respect to partners, ability to sustain dialogue with oneself, and 
internal integrity. 
This has also been the source of mutually negative experience of religious and 
journalistic communicators: if, on one hand, there is little or no motivation to pursue higher 
professional goals, and put in more effort (by those who provide the source information for 
journalists – i. e. those in charge of selection and processing in secular journalists, and in 
religious journalists working in church media responsible for wrapping religious messages 
into journalistic garments), then religious messages rarely drop through the sieve of news 
values, which then appears as-if too dense, irregularly woven, etc. Laziness coupled with lack 
of professionalism on both sides results in two extremes: journalists either give up gospel 
value, and, subsequently, superficial news values deprive the information of its content and 
meaning (a typical example can be a piece of news with an account of secondary phenomena 
such as the Pope’s menu, health condition, and the Pope’s tailor, when covering an important 
pastoral visit of the Pope, i. .e a piece of news  which completely ignores the main idea). Or, 
on the other hand, journalists often give up news values, and thus leave journalistic style 
completely, which makes the news difficult to accept or digest by the audience.   
Thus, in an effort to pull out a religious message from its natural environment and 
encode it medially, the understanding and acceptance of news values appears to be one of the 
key preconditions of success. “It is kind of a tax we pay to the journalistic environment,” said 
Antonín Randa, chief editor of the Czech Katolícky týdeník. According to Randa, this process 
sometimes requires even resignation on the essence of a piece of information (message).  
Here, we will examine in more detail some of the news values, which can be associated 
with religious messages. During our research, the following news values were identified as 
crucial: (1) conflict first and foremost, then (2) scandalousness, (3) entertainment, (4) 
fragmentation, (5) incompleteness, (6) stereotypes, and (7) story. For the sake of brevity, the 
following passage provides an account of news values, where religious and media communication 





As clear from the aforementioned, the single most important news value is conflict. This can 
be supported by the fact that as part of the textual analysis and subsequent critical journalistic 
coverage, some authors limit themselves to the conflict itself, and regard conflict as the 
primary key for selection and coverage of topics by a professional journalist. By examining 
religious news coverage (especially the news about papal pastoral journeys) by secular 
media, Imrich Gazda arrived at a conclusion that journalists try to find a conflict in each 
topic, and for those topics where no conflict exists, they “elaborate” it (i. e. artificially re-
create it, and thus, manipulate the news). (Gazda, 2009). 
 As demonstrated by our focus group research, common recipients see the emphasis of 
media on conflict almost negatively – they find it exaggerated and unnatural. The more 
critical part of the audience is usually able to identify that pervasive conflict does not 
correspond to reality. The use of conflict almost everywhere makes them feel manipulated 
and scornful about it. It is felt that journalists in their quest for conflict often over-interpret 
facts and behave arrogantly. With respect to media transmission of religious messages, 
members of our focus groups questioned whether we necessarily need conflict, and whether 
we need to see it in everything. Some have pointed to the fact that when anything served in a 
conflict-free manner fails to induce any thought or attention on the part of the recipient, then, 
Rončáková, T.                                                                                                                          29 
 
the problem does not lie with journalists, but with somebody else – a reader with his or her 
mind reformatted to conflict. And, quite naturally with those who effect, sustain, and promote 
such a mindset, i. e. the journalists. Thus, the aversion to conflict identified in recipients 
points to the artificial nature on one hand, but it also hints to a call for an alternative, 
especially in relation to religious messages in the media.  
 Such calls for an alternative are positive. However, it should be noted that a conflict-
free world cannot become the basis of the output of religious communicators, since that 
would bring us to the opposite – not less negative – extreme. Such an approach poses a risk 
of abandoning the media language completely since this would deprive the media language of 
one of its key characteristics. For any critical recipient, a conflict-free approach to covering 
religious topics stinks of a false calm, suppression of facts, creation of ‘smoke screens’, 
distrust in the recipient’s preparedness to hear the truth. “The church should not see itself as a 
monolith,” said one of the participants of our research discussions in response to the idea to 
provide more room for opinion for more stakeholders in relation to religious topics. 
A conflict-free approach exaggerated to the extreme also hampers the efficiency of the 
transmitted message and is just as implausible as emphasizing conflict at any cost.  
 But why does the church avoid conflict when spreading its messages through the 
media? Opinions voiced during our research point towards two main reasons: caution and 
lack of freedom.  
 According to Jozef Kováčik, spokesperson of the Slovak Bishops’ Conference, public 
statements (made by priests) on social issues should be guided by the principle of wisdom 
and prudence. According to Kováčik, the Papal Nuncio’s Office in Slovakia has 
recommended talking about principles, and refraining from mentioning specific persons – not 
even dictators such as Hitler or Chávez (Kováčik, 2009). The church is inerrant and cannot 
afford to discredit herself by the flaw of ‘personalizing’ the negatives, since every person 
develops and the history teaches us that providing a certificate of veracity – or doing the 
opposite – is often uncertain and deceptive. “It is a problem to stand behind someone – you 
never know what may come out of that person,” explains Juraj Gradoš, a Greek-Catholic 
priest. This pertains not only to political parties, presidential candidates, but also political and 
social problems in broadest sense. The response of those recipients who find specific political 
and social tensions or struggles important, was disapproving, especially in relation to the 
trade-off of morality and key values preserved and presented mainly by the church. They 
usually understand silence of the church (and its media) as a clear expression of cowardice, 
sterility and submission to external pressures on the part of the church representatives.  
 With respect to conflict as the key news value, it should be noted that the church puts 
herself in the role of an external observer. Respondents pointed to the fact that the church’s 
typical reaction is no reaction, i. e. she expresses her attitude by remaining silent. „ 
Such a reaction does not give the respective topic any importance,“ explains J. Kováčik 
(2009). Thereby the church wisely reacts to the so-called agenda setting, where media 
themselves try to define what will be ‘talked about’. They first create a virtual reality and 
then project the importance of a specific topic in the eyes of the recipients, often artificially, 
in contradiction with the real value of that topic. The church does not wish to use her 
authority to promote, draw attention, or give credit to such topics. Thus, however, it falls into 
the trap of non-intervention. There is one more example of this. In the turbulent years around 
2000, there was a real battle going on for support of the weekly between the Movement for 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), a party involved in bloody scandals, the extreme nationalist 
Slovak National Party (SNS), and Christian Democratic Movement avowing also Christian 
values. The former chief editor of the Slovak national weekly Katolícke noviny (Catholic 
Newspaper), Marián Gavenda, stated on behalf of the attitude of the weekly that “in the 
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newspaper, we would rather keep the line of a slight sterility, than assume the risk of being 
labeled as a supporter of a certain political representation” (Gavenda, 2005). 
Such an approach, however, leads to embargos on certain topics and people in the 
broadcasting time conquered – so to speak – by the church within the media space (either by 
creating own media or by obtaining broadcasting time in public media). As part of our 
research discussions, a number of journalists complained about embargo imposed on certain 
people and topics. Oddly enough, topics and people potentially creating conflicts or 
introducing inadequate opinions are simply not welcome. However, this approach might lead 
to a situation where correct views are not apparent enough for recipients, who, in turn, might 
end up confused. As noted by J. Kováčik, broadcasting time is very precious, and it is not a 
good idea to waste it by presenting different opinions; it should be used to present our own 
view. Admittedly, this approach aims only at those who are already convinced. But the 
unconvinced (or those convinced about the opposite) need confrontation so they can make 
their own decision as to where they stand. „The aim is not to win new Catholics, but deepen 
the faith of believers, which should happen in a conflict-free manner,” confirms the 
(subconscious) intention of the authors M. Raučinová, editor of Katolícke noviny. 
 Based on the results of our research, the second reason of avoiding conflict as 
mentioned above is lack of independence of the church or her representatives. This was 
repeatedly voiced by participants of our focus groups, especially in connection with the need 
of a more active social (hence political) engagement of the church. Within the groups, 
participants presented a strong view that public engagement of the church is very unlikely – 
even unthinkable – because bishops (not only Catholic) tend to collaborate with power, and 
‘get along well’ with anybody. The underlying idea is not to anger the state, i. e. the 
government currently in power, because the church depends on state finances. According to 
the participants of our research, the disestablishment of the church and state might offer a 





Common media recipients are more ready to mention ‘scandal’ in connection with media 
coverage, than ‘conflict’. This was confirmed by our focus group discussions. Scandal seems 
to be the most striking of all news values. Scandals were among the first things mentioned by 
members of our research discussions in respect of religious topics. In addition, participants 
have also touched on the problem of the incomplete coverage of scandals. Recipients with 
deeper understanding of the problem have identified a lack of interest on the part of media to 
address all open questions related to the news, and their reluctance to clear the names of those 
injured, when the particular case eventually ends in favor of suspected persons. This, 
however, is a problem that goes beyond the relation of media and religious topics. It is a 
serious ethical problem addressed by established journalistic ethic codes by introducing the 
right to a supplementary announcement8.  
 Nevertheless, scandal still belongs to the basic news values. Media cannot be blamed 
for this, although, quite naturally, the church representatives may feel that information about 
the church only enters the media on the condition of the existence of a scandal. “Media try to 
maintain their secular profile and focus exclusively on information, but only until a scandal 
comes up. From that moment, media are eager to cover religious topics,” explains Juraj 
Gradoš, chief editor of Slovo, a Greek-Catholic bi-weekly. 
 In this respect, two questions have emerged during our research: (1) Is sensitivity of 
media to religious topics primarily sensation-driven, i. e. negativistic? If yes, this would point 
to a prejudice against religious topics, which should be examined separately. And, (2) Is the 
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reaction of the church to scandals brought by media well controlled and well managed? The 
question pertains to the problem of intra-church dialogue, which is also a topic for a separate 
paper. Here, we will limit ourselves to present several preliminary considerations. 
 The expression scandal originally means offence, in the first place. Scandal relates to 
offence – it is based on something, which contradicts the declared, expected, or required 
integrity of the scandalized person. In the case of church topics, the focus is on the 
contradiction between behavior and Christian moral principles, which the person upholds and 
declares. In that respect, media scandals can also be viewed positively as they may point to 
mistakes, and can be viewed as an opportunity to defend and strengthen the position of the 
church.  
As stated by N. González Gaitano, in principle, media messages are based on the so-
called topoi, i. e. a set of generally shared ideas. These are some principles – whether natural 
or cultural – which are not subject to public discussion, and which are accepted and taken as 
given. According to N. González Gaitano (2009) many topoi have roots in the gospel. 
However, media often build false structures and based thereupon they present internally 
contradictory and misleading conclusions (e. g. homosexuals refer to equality, but, in fact, 
what they ask for is social acceptance, not equality). For the church, this is a chance to 
uncover contradictions, touch upon the human mind and soul by drawing on this generally 
shared idea, and pursue a solid argumentation line on that basis. According to Gaitano’s 
research, this was the case during the Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to USA in April 2008. The 
Pope has managed to use direct personal contact to change predominantly negative views of 
media prior to the visit. In particular, this has become apparent in connection with sexual 
misconduct by priests, which was hotly debated in the USA at that time. By being frank and 
consistent, even in answering questions about the sexual abuse within the church during the 
visit, the Pope has managed to purify the image of the church in the eyes of the public. Thus, 
the scandal was positively used in favor of the church.  
 During our research discussions, the recipients have called for clear statements by the 
church on essential topics – including topics that scandalize the church. The church wishes to 
do so wisely, and, in Slovakia, she prefers excluding the public (hence the media) from a 
dialogue and solution of problems. The church is afraid of the immaturity of recipients, and 
refrains from disclosing her best arguments to avoid misuse. Here, the church relies on its 
timeless existence and stability, which is, so to speak, confirmed by centuries. However, it 
should be noted that the task of the church is to approach those who live today. Therefore the 
church needs to build bridges of trust with the living. And that can only happen if she 
preserves her moral authority. “From 1989, the church has not been regarded as a moral 
authority “, says Rado Pavlík, editor of SITA agency with a specialty in religious topics 
during one of our meetings with media experts. According to Pavlík, the reason behind this is 
the church’s reluctance to interpret current news and events. On the other hand, continuous 
scandalizing of the church points to the fact that the institution is still regarded as a carrier of 
certain moral values, which should be upheld by the church herself.  In that light, media 
scandals are, to a certain extent, a thrown gauntlet, which should be picked up by an able 
communicator to show that the church accepts guilt on members of the church, resolutely 
resolves incidents, makes clear statements, takes effective measures, and, if appropriate, 
provides inconvertible proof of innocence, in a word, the church must communicate and face 










From the beginning of journalism until today, story has always been one of the most 
important carriers of information. As stated by D. Klimeš (2009), today, it is imperative to 
insert stories where ten years ago, a description would do. In practice, this means that when a 
journalist attempts to inform about introducing fees at the doctor’s, a story of a homeless is 
woven into the news, thus, plain news is hinged onto a story with strong social connotations. 
 The story, as a significant news value and part of the journalistic language code, is 
highly correlated with traditional instruments used in spreading religious messages, 
especially testimonies. Testimony is one of the key instruments of the church which can be 
employed to pursue her evangelization efforts. According to Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, the name catechesis was given to “the totality of the Church’s efforts to make 
disciples, to help men believe that Jesus is the Son of God so that believing they might have 
life in his name, and to educate and instruct them in this life, thus building up the body of 
Christ. (CCC 4). (Rončáková, 2009) 
 A story in the form of a testimony appears to share common ground in respect of both 
the news values and gospel values, hence, it is one of the most efficient ways of encoding 
religious messages into media language. This was also substantiated by members of our 
research discussions, who agreed that stories can successfully carry religious messages. “If 
we are to evangelize ‘between the lines’, presenting stories of our readers is a very effective 
way to do that,” explains M. Raučinová, editor of Katolícke novniny. And the chief editor of 
Slovo, a Greek-Catholic bi-weekly adds that the news about God becomes journalistically 
attractive, if it contains what Jesus has done on earth: “the blind see, the lame walk, and the 
deaf hear... And that’s gospel.“ 
 To reject to include a story is to reject the essence of media communication code and 
media language as such. On the other hand, to regard story as a significant means of 
expression leads to efficient media communication. “My job is not to produce messages 
about harmful effects of contraception or the evil of artificial abortion on a daily basis, but 
provide the audience with stories of ordinary people,” says Radoslav Igaz to describe his job 
within the journalistic team of the most popular commercial television in Slovakia, Markíza 
(Igaz, 2009). If he decided to smuggle his own position in the news item at any cost, he 
would quickly close the door for any religious message. Bringing light stories of people in the 
street might seem less creative or serious, and less prestigious journalism. However, Igaz, 
with a healthy dose of modesty, regards such stories as an effective tool to present spiritual or 
even religious values. As he puts it, even for him personally, covering these stories is 
encouraging, and therefore he seeks to encourage viewers.  
 To encourage people, to give them hope, to reveal the origins of God’s intentions 
contained in Revelation and religion in front of people’s eyes is, after all, the very aim of the 
church seeking to spread the good news. This was also the point made by Alžbeta Mráková, 
chief editor of Família, a Catholic family weekly. She sees “difficult stories of families – 
their stumbles, their victories, and their quests for a new meaning of life” as one of the key 





This paper investigates the inherent features of media language code and attempts to examine 
them in the light of the spreading of religious messages through media. It was shown that in 
several aspects which are crucial for media code, the journalistic encoding of messages and 
the religious encoding diverge. However, such a disproportion is not inevitable. On the 
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contrary, the inherent features of media communication code also facilitate an efficient 
transmission of religious messages.  
 Our key thesis was based on a premise that one of the pillars of the media language 
code is the structure of news values. Without embracing these values a journalist cannot 
exercise the profession and work effectively within its communication framework. News 
values are ‘values’ which make the information ‘worth’ attention of both the journalist and 
recipient. On the other hand, gospel values are values which make the religious message 
worth its name. If the journalistic encoding of a religious message is to be successful, 
intersection between journalistic and religious values needs to be found. Does such 
intersection exist? We may conclude that such intersection exists, but this can only be 
achieved at the cost of investing more effort and placing higher demands on journalists, 
which are required to be prepared to look for news values under the surface of instincts and 
instinctual drives. News values can be viewed as certain ‘rules of profession’; without them, 
the output transmitted through the media space cannot be regarded as media product. This 
means that in principle, it is possible to produce journalistic materials containing religious 
messages.  
 When individual news values are put under scrutiny, a set of values which help to 
spread religious messages becomes more evident. As part of our research we have focused on 
three of them: conflict, scandal and story.  
For the church, conflict is a quite naturally part of her public presence. “Do you 
suppose that I am here to bring peace on earth? No, I tell you, but rather division,“ said Jesus 
Christ (Luke 12,51). Anyone who remains faithful and clings onto the ‘uncomfortable’ 
Christian mission eventually runs into conflict with the environment. A correct understanding 
and comprehension of the essence and power of conflict as the most important news value 
represents a huge potential for religious messages in media environment. However, our 
research has also revealed fears of a conflict on the part of religious communicators, as well 
as a tendency to avoid such conflict. We have identified two main causes of such a fear: first, 
caution (as an extreme expression of discretion) and second, internal dependence (material 
dependence on the power of state). Exploiting the potential of conflict by the church requires 
very able religious communicators. Lack of such communicators appears to be one of the 
main reasons behind the failure in this field. The ability to enter this arena requires courage. 
Indeed, calls for courage were often voiced by participants of our research discussions, who 
also identified a significant gap in the understanding of the social teaching of the church. “If 
the church consistently stood on the side of the oppressed and the weak, it would inevitably 
run into conflicts,“ concluded one of the respondents. Common recipients participating in our 
focus groups have pointed to the lack of topics such as economic crisis, layoffs, management 
ethics, inadequate profits, or ethnic conflicts, in the coverage of the church media. This 
finding also points to the fact which has continued to reemerge in our research discussions: 
media recipients regard explication of social and political events in the light of the teaching 
of the church as one of the most significant challenges the church faces today.  
Scandal is an expression, which also bears the meaning of an offence. However, any 
offence is based on a generally accepted idea with roots in nature or culture (topos). Even 
though in its negative extreme, scandals presented in media are often sensation-driven, in 
principle, it can also be employed to spread religious message, or cement the authority and 
credibility of the church. This can be done by correct treatment of topos and skillful 
communication based thereupon. This may also comprise reactions of religious 
communicators to existing scandals, or active incitement of public uproar over a contemptible 
action and the motivation of such an action.  
 Story is a carrier with the biggest potential to communicate religious messages 
through media. It can be identified with testimony, which is the single most powerful tool, 
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which may help the church in spreading the news about God and His presence in the life of 
people on earth. Personal testimony of God at work is very powerful, and, at the same time, it 
is not artificial and works ‘between the lines’. It is inappropriate to look at communicators of 
religious messages who use stories as ‘lower-style’ journalists who seek escape from serious 
journalism.  
 As for other characteristics inherently contained in the essence of the media language 
code, we have identified qualities such as fragmentation, ‘flashiness’, generalization and 
simplification, limited ability to transmit the essence of things, superficial character, 
disinterest about quality, certain language-related specifics and audience awareness. For the 
sake of brevity, we cannot deal with them in more detail. In general, the communication code 
of media communication in connection with the religious message can be regarded as an 
inhibitor, which – if employed correctly – may become a catalyst. We have pointed to some 
specific problems and their solutions, the employment of which may contribute to 
professionalism of both communicators, i. e. the journalists, and persons authorized to 





2 This study was based on Catholic research sample, and the cultural context of this study is 
also Catholic. 
3 R. Entman defines framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, 
and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, 
and/or solution” (Entman, 2004). According to him, frames have four functions. They define 
the terms of a problem, offer a causal interpretation, encapsulate a moral opinion on it and 
promise a solution, remedy or line of action (Entman, 1993). 
4 Continuum is a media audience research concept by David Morley or Abercrombie 
and Longhurst. It represents a series of different types of audience depending on their 
passivity/activity – from the most passive consumers accepting anything that is brought up – 
likened to a sack of potatoes sitting in a sofa in front of a TV – to more selective and critical 
types of audience with stronger technical background, to the so-called petty producers, i.e. 
recipients who interactively enter the arena of media communication, and are able and willing 
to produce authentic media content (Sorice, 2007). 
5 An attempt to provide a complete list of all virtues was made by Hildegard of Bingen in the 
12th century, and includes 35 virtues matched to respective vices. The listed virtues include 
discipline, chastity, mercifulness, patience, moderation, generosity, truthfulness, peace, 
humility, obedience, justice, courage and perseverance (Rajčan Zaviš, 2007, p. 108). 
6 Consultation with D. Contreras conducted as part of the research. 
7 Presented at the international conference Identità e Missione di una Facoltà di 
Comunizacione di una Università Cattolica (Identity and Mission of the Faculty of 
Communication at the Catholic University), organized at the instigation of the Pontifical 
Council for Social Communications on 22 – 24 May 2008 in Rome.  
8 The right to a supplementary announcement is the right of a person mentioned in the media 
in connection with a suspected criminal activity to be provided with a room to present a piece 
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Abstract: Images are tools in the social construction of reality. The meaning of images, 
however, is not a feature of the image itself but the outcome of a communicative 
process that involves a negotiation between social actors with a stake, interests and 
resources to participate in the process. The theory of social representation provides a 
useful conceptual framework to capture this process and to look at the ideological 
influences that affects the visual construction of meaning in the digital age. From this 
perspective, I challenge the belief that digital visuality is a form of communication with 
emancipative power for the mere fact that it facilitates non-institutional and amateur 
production and circulation of images. I claim instead that the emancipative potential of 
this as other forms of visuality depends on their effects on the process through which 
images are given meaning – supporting or undermining openness, diversity, etc. – and 
on the nature of the meanings that can – or cannot – find expression in this process. 
Applying the theory of social representation to the analysis of the social construction of 
meaning for the images of 9/11, Abu-Ghraib and the Arab Spring, I argue that the 
influence of hegemonic ideology has been decisive in the repression of interpretations 
of these images with subversive or emancipative potential.   






The social construction of visual meaning and the role of digital visuality 
 
In a previous discussion (Stocchetti, 2014), I argued that the idea that digital visuality 
can have emancipative, political functions is based on problematic beliefs concerning 
the relation of visuality with truth, community and the construction of the real. These 
beliefs are associated with the use of images in accordance with at least three main 
logics or “principles” which I described as follows: 
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1. the “reality principle”, or the idea that images can “show” or otherwise provide 
some important or truthful piece of information and that vision is associated with 
authoritative knowledge (“what you see is what you get”);   
2. the “pleasure principle”, or the idea that what really matters is not the 
information an image provides and the relation between the image and what it 
shows, but rather the ritualistic use of the image in the constitution of a 
community of meaning and ultimately the relationship between individuals 
united by the fact of giving the same meaning to the same image;  
3. the “hyper-reality principle”, or the idea that an image, instead of providing 
information or performing a ritual can be a simulacra: a communicative tool 
used to actually “hide” rather than “showing” relevant aspects of reality.   
Implicit in these logics is a notion of meaning which contains at least two important 
features. First, the meaning of images is not a permanent feature of the image itself but 
an impermanent outcome of a communicative process: the social construction of visual 
meaning. This process can be usefully looked at as a political process in which some 
participants are more influential than others and issues of meanings are always 
associated with issues of power. Second, if relations of power and relations of meaning 
are mutually constitutive – each one depends on the other – the interpretation of the 
political role of visual communication has to face a fundamental problem of 
indeterminacy: relations of meaning cannot be determined independently from relations 
of power and vice versa. 
 
In this paper I will continue my discussion on the political role of digital visuality 
starting from the last general hypothesis which may be useful to recall here: 
 
If digital visuality cannot credibly reduce the indeterminacy of visual communication in its 
conventional functions of political propaganda and community building, one may still claim that, 
compared e.g. to conventional photography, digital visuality affects the social construction of reality 
in at least three ways. First, it opens up the practice of visual communication to large parts of the 
populations, blurring the distinction between producer, distributor and consumer of visual objects 
(…). Second, it enhances the productive capacity of visual technology beyond reality itself, into the 
hyper-real e.g. enabling the production of images that transcend the human perspective (…). Third, it 
performs as a logic for the representation of reality that have pedagogical implications and enhances 
the social value of visual communication in the social construction of reality (…) independently from 
reality itself. The combined effects of these three changes introduced by digital visuality, one may 
suggest, are “emancipative” on political grounds to the extent that their role is “subversive” of the 
social construction of reality. Political emancipation, in other words, is associated to the dissolution of 
the relations of power legitimized by notions of truth and reality that are effectively challenged by the 
logic of digital visuality, the hyperrealism of its representations, and the widespread access to both. To 
change the world, one should first change the way we look at it. Digital visuality can help in looking 
the world not as it is but as it could be (utopia/dystopia). (2014) 
In the pages that follow, I look a bit deeper into the social construction of visual 
meaning to understand the conditions which may foster or undermine the emancipative 
potential of digital visuality in the social construction of visual meaning.   
 
To look at these conditions, I will apply the Theory of Social Representation to the 
analysis of the social construction of visual meaning associated with the attacks of 9/11 
and the events that followed - the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the abuses committed 
on Iraqi war prisoners at Abu Ghraib and the rebellions of the “Arab Spring”. The 
nature, meanings and socio-political implications of the images associated to these 
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events have inspired many important analyses (Blaagaard, Mortensen, & Neumayer, 
2017).  
 
Compared to previous ones, the main coordinates of my exploration cover 
methodological and more substantial grounds. In terms of method, there are excellent 
analyses that have discussed the political role of the visual representation of violence in 
terms of visual discourse (for example, Shepherd, 2008). Here, however, I suggest that 
the Theory of Social Representation, when applied as originally formulated by Serge 
Moscovici, is a distinctively productive approach when the problem is that of 
disambiguating the meaning of images and assess the actual impact of visuality on 
relations of power (what here I call “relevant social meaning”). This problem is 
important especially in aesthetic approaches to political analysis in which “the 
inevitable difference between the represented and its representation is the very location 
of politics” (Bleiker, 2001, p. 510). In relation to the representation of violence, this 
“difference” is constitutive of the politics of aesthetics and what Jacques Rancière has 
described as, “the distribution of the sensible” or the activity that “establishes at one and 
the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts” (Ranciére, 2004 
(200), p. 12). In this perspective, and in line with Judith Butler, “interpretation is not to 
be conceived restrictively as a subjective act” and, as I shall argue in a moment, “the 
photograph itself becomes a structuring scene of interpretation” (Butler, 2009, p. 67). 
This role is fundamentally political or, one may argue, even constitutive of the political 
itself, since, for example, it is at the origin of the performative power that Ariella 
Azoulay called “the civil contract of photography” (Azoulay, 2008) 
 
In relation to the political affordances of visual communication, however, my analysis 
reveals at least two grounds for scepticism concerning its subversive or even 
“revolutionary” power. First, powerful ideological elements in the social construction of 
visual meaning are influential in dissolving the indeterminacy of digital visuality to the 
detriment of the emancipative encouragement of digital visuality. Second, the same 
discussion also discloses the capacity of hegemonic representations to enforce selective 
usage of available visual technology: while the “radical potential” of digital visuality is 
thwarted, its instrumentality in support of hegemony if fully exploited.  
 
Social representation 
In its original formulation by Serge Moscovici - his study on the impact of 
psychoanalysis on the French society of the late 50s and, in particular, on the social 
identities of Catholics and Communists (Moscovici, 1961) (Moscovici, 2008) - this 
approach addresses questions of meanings associated to the assimilation of scientific 
knowledge in society. Among the most relevant of these questions is social change, the 
communicative construction of meaning and the adaptation of social identities to 
changes introduced by scientific knowledge in the perception of the world. For our 
purpose, this approach contains at least two significant tenets. The first is that meaning 
is created in communicative practices. The second is that these communicative practices 
involve social identities in the double role of cause and effects: sources of change and 
passible of changes themselves. 
 
Empirical research on social representation focuses mostly on written and oral 
communication. Interest on visual communication has been scarce in the past but is now 
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growing and the idea that images participate in important ways to the social 
representation of relevant phenomena has gained widespread currency (Howart, 2011) 
(De Rosa & Farr, 2001) (Sen & Wagner, 2005).  
 
In applying the theory of social representation to the political role of digital visuality I 
am not claiming that images are empirical proofs concerning the nature of social 
representation of phenomena. Rather I suggest that the process of social representation 
is influential in the attribution of socially relevant meaning to both images and 
phenomena. Furthermore, this approach helps the analysts to grasp the hermeneutic 
circle of visual meaning: the fact that, in the practices of visual communication, the 
phenomenon gives social meaning to the image as much as the image gives social 
meaning to the phenomenon.  
 
In this paper I cannot discuss exhaustively all the articulations, concepts and tenets that 
animate the contemporary debate on social representation. What I would like to do, 
instead, is to provide the reader with few, basic conceptual coordinates to grasp the 
heuristic opportunities offered by this approach to the study of visual communication1. 
Simplified to the extreme, the basic conceptual framework for the approach of social 
representation should include at least the following concepts: event, themata, 
objectification, naturalization and anchoring. 
 
The Event 
The process of social representation is in essence a communicative process for the 
production of meaning that is triggered by an event. This is a more or less dramatic 
occurrence, a phenomenon or an object that forces a re-definition of social identities by 
activating deeply seated ideas or beliefs called themata (see below). The event, in this 
perspective, is not a mere occurrence but something that a social community 
experiences as a fundamental challenge: something that cannot be ignored and that 
requires a response in terms of re-adjustment. The important idea here is that the social 
construction of meaning is triggered by the traumatic or semi-traumatic implications of 
the event for the community experiencing it. Moscovici himself is quite explicit about 
the importance of this idea when he notes that “a social representation emerges when 
there is a threat to the collective identity and when the communication of knowledge 
submerges the rules society has set itself” (Moscovici, 2008, p. 104).  
 
For Wagner et al: 
Without an object being salient and relevant for a social group and hence entailing a public discourse 
and symbolic elaboration of the object, there is not much sense in looking for a shared representation 
(Wagner et al 1996, 347) 
Sakki notes that not the scientific but the social relevance of the object or phenomenon 
is the condition that leads to social representation 
                                                 
1 For this purpose, and to avoid burdening this preliminary discussion, I will refer to the recent publication by Finnish 
social psychologist, Inari Sakki on the social representation of European identity in school textbook (Sakki, 2010). 
This work is, to my knowledge, the most recent and accurate description of the concepts and theoretical debates 
pertaining to the theory of social representations in its current state. 
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The SRT [social representation theory, NdA] studies specific kinds of representations: those that have 
become the subject of public concern. They are thought about, discussed and they may cause tensions 
and provoke actions. Therefore, the object of study must be socially meaningful and necessitate 
communication (Sakki, 2010, p. 76) 
The fundamental idea at the roots of social representation (in the singular as a process) 
is that a problem generates communication about the meaning of the problem itself. 
Social representations (in the plural) are communicative objects emerging from the 
identity threats associated to the activation of themata by an event which have a 
traumatic impact on the community – e.g. war, revolutions etc. As we shall see in a 
moment, the exercise of organized violence is a special type of event that requires 
elaboration because of the ambivalent nature of this violence: both a problem and a 
solution for the integrity of the community. 
 
Digital visuality can play a fundamental role in the visual construction of the event. This 
is probably the single most important “point of entry” for the emancipative role of DV. 
But also the most jealously guarded prerogative of media organizations: to be first on 
the spot, to go “live”, etc. The visual construction of the event is a crucial stake in the 
competition for the control over the social construction of reality. Digital visuality 
facilitates the participation of individuals but organizational, cultural and legal factors 
still support the influence of institutional media – individual images about a certain 
event become relevant if and when appropriated by media organizations. This re-
appropriation is a form of usage that erodes or suppresses the radical potential of images 
by simply complying with the conventions, “styles”, legal provisions etc. that regulate 
media work (e.g. not showing dead bodies of “our” soldier nor bodies of “their” dead 
children in war coverage)  
 
Themata 
According to Inari Sakki: 
Themata are those ideas around which representations are constituted and which engender them. 
Therefore, they have a normative and generative power in the formation of social representations. 
Themata are shared knowledge or beliefs of which people implicitly or explicitly think and talk about, 
and which often are taken for granted. They are rooted in collective memory of a group. They may not 
be expressed aloud in communication but they underlie socially shared knowledge. They are a kind of 
a deep structure or representation and not always open to direct observation (Sakki, 2010, p. 61) 
Sakki notes that these themata are “deep” and difficult to observe presumably because 
they are either hidden also to those who share them (themata are semiconscious) or they 
are difficult to express (themata are irreducible to texts) or even sensitive aspects of 
people identity (themata are kept “secret” to avoid direct challenges to one’s identity). 
My suggestion here is that, if themata are both “social and deep”, relevant traces or 
signs of them should be found at cultural level or even – as I would argue in relation to 
the cases in exam here – at the level of institutionalized ideas e.g. in political theory or 
other forms of authoritative knowledge which can be associated to the object of 
representation. 
 
The emancipative/subversive potential of digital visuality depends on its capacity to 
activate emancipative/subversive themata. The problem here is to see if and when such 
things as “emancipative themata” actually exist. In social representation theory, the 
Stocchetti, M.                                                                                                                   43 
 
notions of “emancipated” and “polemic” representations designate representations 
shared by small groups or subgroups still compatible or in opposition to the 
“hegemonic” representations shared in some measure by all and constituting the „core” 
of the social identity (Ben-Asher, 2003, pp. 6.3-6.4). One can probably find 
interpretations of themata with subversive implications e.g. re-interpretation, re-
contextualization, etc. Ultimately it is all about subverting relations of meanings to 
subvert the relations of power based on them. The theory of social representation 
(supported by cultural and historical knowledge) helps identifying these themata and 
understanding their communicative values in the processes of social representation and 
in the social construction of visual meaning. 
  
 
Objectification & Naturalization 
“Social representations – wrote Serge Moscovici – take shape according to two basic 
processes: objectification and anchoring” (Moscovici, 2008, p. 54) (Italics in the 
original). In the description of Sakki, “objectification is a process where something 
abstract is transformed into something almost physical and concrete. It means 
translating something that exists in our thoughts into something that exists in reality” 
(Sakki, 2010, p. 53). An especially interesting aspect of this process is its connection 
with visuality. As Sakki notes, “objectifying is to discover the iconic aspect of an ill-
defined idea or being, that is, to match a concept with an image” (Sakki, 2010, p. 55). 
The idea behind this description is that images do in fact perform an important function 
of mediation between the world of ideas and the world of material object, transforming 
ideas (e.g. war) into objects (e.g. the images of war). For communicative purposes, 
concepts perform a rather similar function but objectification into an image seems to 
increase the intelligibility of a concept and therefore to facilitate its assimilation and 
divulgation, albeit in the simplified form of a visual image (De Rosa & Farr, 2001, pp. 
6-7). This “simplification” or the transformation of a concept into an image is the 
temporary result of a negotiation over the conceptual meaning of images and it is in 
principle passible of further transformation as result of dissemination and further 
negotiation. 
 
The idea expressed in the notion of naturalization or “...when something abstract 
becomes real”, and “an object become part of the social reality” (Sakki, 2010, pp. 55-
56) points in my view, to the elements of continuity in the transformation of a concept 
into an image. In other words, it looks at the stage of the construction of meaning in 
which meanings are agreed upon and, to an extent, considered as “given” for further 
communication. In this communication, what is objectified/naturalized in a given image 
or set of images, can be denaturalized if and when there are agents with enough interest 
and resources to effectively do that. In this sense, objectification and naturalization 
should not be considered static results of communicative process but communicative 
processes themselves through which the unfamiliar become familiar.  
 
The notions of objectification/naturalization assume but do not (yet) articulate the 
influence of visuality in concept formation and, or for our discussion, the influence of 
digital visuality in the autonomous formation of concepts by individuals and groups. 
What this notion suggests, in other words, is that the political role of digital visuality 
should be seen as mediated by (rather than alternative to) the role of concepts. In this 
perspective, the visual construction of concepts seems a fundamental process in the 
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competition for the control over the social construction of reality. This process - the 
visual formation of concepts - is ultimately where the power of advertisement and 
propaganda rests: establishing representations of reality based on images/concepts that 
organize information according to implicit hierarchies of values (e.g. the concept of 
citizenship based on the enmification of the non-citizens as in nationalistic propaganda) 
(see e.g. Roland Barthes Mythologies (Barthes, 1972) and Andrew Wernick, 
Promotional Culture (Wernick, 1991). 
 
 
  Anchoring 
Anchoring is the “second major process” of social representation (Moscovici, 2008, p. 
104) whose main function is to make the unfamiliar familiar or, more precisely “to 
anchor strange ideas to reduce them to ordinary categories and images, to set them in a 
familiar context… which draws something foreign and disturbing that intrigues us into 
our particular system of categories…” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 29). 
 
More recently, Sakki describes anchoring as a process through which: 
New or strange phenomena-object, experiences, relations and practices are attached to everyday 
categories and worldviews and offered a familiar reference point. Anchoring integrates the emerging 
representation into a network of significance, marked by social values, generating a system of 
interpretation (Sakki, 2010, p. 50).  
As a further connotation, the notion of emotional anchoring seems particularly useful. 
Emotional anchoring and objectification are described as  
…communicative processes by which a new phenomenon is attached to well-known positive or 
negative emotions, for example fear or hope. In this way the unknown becomes recognizable as, for 
example, a threat, a danger, or as something nice and pleasurable (Höijer, 2010, p. 719) 
Anchoring seems a crucial moment in the social construction of visual meaning. This is 
where disambiguation takes its final turn and, for example, the images of war or abuses 
are construed as images of victory or defeat, pleasure or pain, from the point of view of 
the victimizer or the victim, etc. However, since the meaning of the image is not a 
feature of the image but the outcome of the use of the image, images can be re-
appropriated and given very different meanings in alternative anchoring. 
 
Digital visuality and the politics of meaning: from 9/11 to the “Arab spring”  
In The Spirit of Terrorism, Baudrillard argues that, after the “stagnation of the 
1990s…with the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, we might even be 
said to have before us the absolute event, the ‘mother’ of all events, the pure event 
uniting within itself all the events that have never taken place” (Baudrillard, 2003 
(2002), pp. 3-4). Interpreted in its symbolical dimension as a “humiliation” (Baudrillard, 
2003 (2002), p. 100) those attacks posed a serious threat to the credibility of beliefs 
concerning fundamental aspects of US collective identity (e.g. exceptionalism, 
invulnerability, moral supremacy, etc.) and therefore to the integrity of that identity. It 
was this event and this threat that generated the social representation as a 
communicative and defensive response to that threat. 
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In the terms of the theory of social representation, therefore, 9/11 is the event that 
generates social representations and activates at least one fundamental themata that pre-
existed the event itself: the relationship between West/US capitalism and Islam 
construed in terms of a competition between societies based on incompatible hierarchies 
of values. 
 
The visual imagery used in the news coverage of that event - the images of the Twin 
Towers, violated, burning and collapsing associated to the images of Arab people 
celebrating the attacks as a victory – participated to the construction of the event itself 
as a trauma. It established the fundamental ambivalence that accompanies the hetero-
referential visual representation of competitive in-group vs. out-group relationship (Sen 
& Wagner, 2005): the suffering of one is the pleasure of the other.  
 
In this traumatic event, images participate to the social construction of meaning. They 
do so, in all their functions: performing truth claims following the “reality principle”, 
community building in the logic of the “pleasure principle” or even as simulacra, hiding 
to Ego important aspects concerning Alter. In this process, images play a fundamental 
role in constituting an influential context for the experiencing of other events (the US 
led invasion of Iraq, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the “Arab spring”) and the 
interpretation of the relative imagery.  
 
The nature of this context, and the role of digital visuality, pertain to the distinctive 
features of the way in which 9/11 was constructed as a visual event. First, the 
multiplication of the point of views of the visual coverage of the attacks. Second, the 
enforcement and institutionalization of a “global” gaze unified by available technology 
and by the global value of the event - itself a function of the symbolic values of the 
place (New York as the cultural capital of a certain idea of “West”) and the glamour of 
the feat (two airplanes in two skyscrapers in a few minutes!). Third, simultaneity or the 
global enforcement of the event “real time”. Fourth, juxtaposition or the visual coverage 
of the event through the images of the effects of the attacks in association with the 





To my knowledge, the only subversive idea associated to 9/11 was formulated by 
Baudrillard when, commenting in the aftermath of that event, he wrote: 
The fact that we have dreamt of this event, that everyone without exception has dreamt of it – because 
no one can avoid dreaming of the destruction of any power that has become hegemonic to this degree 
– is unacceptable. Yet it is a fact, and one which can indeed be measured by the motive of violence of 
all that has been said and written in the effort to dispel it. At a pinch, we can say that they did it, but 
we wished for it. If this is not taken into account, the event loses any symbolic dimension.… This 
goes far beyond hatred for the dominant world power among the disinherited and the exploited, 
among those who have ended up on the wrong side of the global order. Even those who share in the 
advantages of that order have this malicious desire in their hearts. Allergy to any definitive order, to 
any definitive power, is – happily – universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center were 
perfect embodiments, in their very twinness, of that order. (Baudrillard, 2003 (2002), p. 6) 
The themata associated to this idea is that of revenge or justice for humiliations inflicted 
upon others in the history of globalization and before - ideas that are too complex to be 
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suitable for the reduction into “live” coverage and too painful to be handled by a 
community facing the agony of awakening to its own vulnerability.  
 
The other and more acceptable – from the perspective of the US society - themata is that 
of the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1998). Activated by 9/11, this themata 
accompanies the interpretation of the US led invasion of Iraq but also, although in 
different forms, the abuses of Abu Ghraib and the Arab Spring. In this latter case, the 
ideas expressed by Francis Fukuyama in its formulation of “the end of history” 
(Fukuyama, 2006) add to the idea of contraposition between West/US capitalism and 
Islam the idea of intrinsic superiority of the former. In the light of this themata the 
images of the Arab spring can be interpreted as a reassuring “sign” of victory for a 
representation of the West/US construed around the core values of corporate capitalism 
and representative democracy at a moment when these values are challenged within the 
West itself (McKinley, 2007) – most visibly by the “Occupy wall street” movement in 
the very same days of the early revolts in those Arab countries 
 
A further themata with deep roots in US political culture is the role of US power in 
world affair and the competition between the main ideologies in US foreign policy 
internationalism vs. nationalism (Shurman, 1974). In the aftermath of 9/11, this themata 
has been influential in the re-definition of US collective identity, e.g. anchoring the 
visual coverage of the invasion of Iraq in terms of “repressed revenge” as a response to 
the different normative imperatives which followed from different ideological 
interpretation of 9/11: Serving the “international community”, performing as the 
policeman of the new world order eliminating a common threat vs. serving national 
interest and restoring the national self-image by revenging the attacks on 9/11.  
 
Finally, the feminization of the enemy is a themata that in both cases of the invasion of 
Iraq and Abu Ghraib, opens up interpretative avenues that I have discussed elsewhere in 
relation to the WAR is LOVE metaphor (Stocchetti, 2009). Put briefly, metaphoric 
associations tend to be bidirectional, and the roles of source and target domain 
interchangeable – which in practice means that  if WAR IS LOVE then LOVE IS WAR. 
Looked at in terms of themata, this idea performs the legitimization of violence and the 
actions of the victimizer on the victim in terms of intentions of the former – as in the 
belief that a certain degree of violence is inherent in passionate relationships expressed 
in the Latin sentence “vis grata puella”. Rooted in deep structures of meaning associated 
to patriarchal conservatism and reactionary ideologies, this idea expresses its generative 
power in all three the cases in exam: in the visual coverage of the invasion of Iraq, with 
the moralization of violence and military technology, in the images of abuses at Abu 
Ghraib and the feminization of war prisoners, and in the celebration of civil strife in the 





The visual coverage of the attacks of 9/11, the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib and the Arab Spring objectifies/naturalizes those events in terms 
of acts of visual display. The concept of visual display in the media, discussed by Anne 
Koski (2011), describes the performativity of visual coverage as a form of a speech act 
that, when performed in public by an official representative of the state, “can be 
interpreted as a purposeful signal” which is “simultaneously intentional and 
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conventional” (Koski, 2011, pp. 93-95). The act of visual display therefore can be seen 
as a political act whose intelligibility depends on ritual functions based on existing 
structures of meaning but that, in the achievement of specific communicative goals (e.g. 
signaling American military supremacy) is not constrained by ritualistic meaning. 
Furthermore, acts of visual display are associated to the symbolic expression of power, 
inviting participation from a particular point of view associated to implicit hierarchies of 
values in the effort of influencing the social construction of socially relevant meanings. 
These hierarchies and the point of view itself can be endorsed or rejected but cannot be 
ignored because embedded in the visual object and the empirical reality of the viewer. 
Objectification in terms of an act of visual display establishes a common experiential 
background for very different opinions about the event themselves. The experience of 
violence is reduced to visual participation, from a particular point of view, for both 
those who enjoy it and those who don’t.  In the coverage of Iraq wars visual 
participation enforced the point of view of the US and its allies. For the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib the point of view was that of the victimizer. For the Arab Spring the point of 
view was, ambivalently, that of the demonstrators as endorsed by Western (mostly BBC 
and CNN) media.   
 
In the war coverage of the US led invasion of Iraq in BBC World and CNN 
International, as presumably in other broadcasting, war was objectified in a form of 
visual communication where the goal was not primarily that of providing information 
but rather that of inducing involvement on one of the sides – the one who could safely 
“embed” journalist and cameraman i.e. the one who could control the visual 
communication about the war itself. This form of coverage was part of the war itself: 
the visual experience of the phenomenon, part of the phenomenon and it can be 
interpreted as an act of visual violence. Watching the agony of Iraqi military from the 
camera of an incoming missile, or in the green light of Allied night vision devices are 
forms of communicative behavior based on applications of digital visuality that enforce 
on the viewer the point of view of the victimizer. If we think that Iraqi people saw on 
BBC and CNN the same images of the “sweaty watcher” described by Nicholas 
Mirzoeff in his Watching Babylon (Mirzoeff, 2005, pp. 1-2), we can understand  how 
this type of broadcasting can perform as an act of visual violence in which the victim 
can see the consummation of her fate with the eyes of the victimizer – a bit like the 
young woman that in the movie “Strange Days” is forced to see her rape “live” with the 
eyes of her rapist. This form of objectification – the reduction of war to its visual 
experience – preserves the ambivalence intrinsic to visual communication. In fact, the 
nature of this involvement is also ambivalent, contingent on conditions independent 
from the nature of the visual text - joyful participation for those who shared the need for 
revenge - like the sweaty watcher in Mirzoeff description - a sort of revulsion for those 
who did not - like Baudrillard in War Porn (Baudrillard, 2006) and Mirzoeff himself - 
and presumably anything in between. Once the experience of war is 
objectified/naturalized in terms of an act of visual display, the paradoxical logic of the 
“society of spectacle” kicks in irresistibly (Debord, 2002 (1967)): “The spectacle is not 
a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images… it is a 
world vision which has become objectified” (Debord, 2002 (1967)). Once the collective 
experience of war is successfully objectified/naturalized in terms of an act of visual 
display not much can be done against the possibility that war itself could be experienced 
in the terms of visual pleasure - as Mirzoeff bitterly observes – or to inhibit the social 
construing of visual war coverage as “real” entertainment compared to the “fictional” 
entertainment of war movies and war games.  
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The images of the abuses committed on Iraqi war prisoners at Abu Ghraib were 
privately produced and therefore hardly imputable or interpretable in terms of a more or 
less deliberate act of psychological warfare. The objectification/naturalization of those 
images in term of an act of visual display should be interpreted on the double track of 
overt and latent meaning. Overtly they were a proof that abuses were committed. 
Latently, they were a proof of the repressed desire of revenge that instigated the war. If 
the institutional war coverage managed to construe the war as an exercise of organized 
violence based on “precise weapons”, inspired by the security of the “international 
community” and implemented professionally and almost deprived of hatred (sine ira et 
sine studio), the images of Abu Ghraib were a window on the private dimension of the 
war. The act of visual display itself was a negation of the institutional interpretation – 
proving it false – and a reaffirmation of the hatred and the desires of revenge that 
institutional war coverage tried to hide. In continuity with the war coverage, however, 
those images enforce participation from the point of view of the victimizer(s): we are 
shown what the photographer saw, a selection of his/her field of visible reality based on 
his/her emotional engagement with the events. Also in continuity with the psychological 
dimension of warfare, those images performed the “feminization of the enemy” which 
was an extension of a narrative logic of the ideological justification for the invasion of 
Iraq (Stocchetti 2009). 
 
The visual coverage of the Arab Spring, at least in its initial phases, is an act of visual 
display in which, like in the invasion of Iraq and the abuses of Abu Ghraib, Western 
audiences are shown the ongoing events from the point of view or the “gaze” that are 
closer to the in-group/identity defined in terms of West/US capitalism. Like in the case 
of Abu Ghraib, circulating images are for the most part privately produced by local 
participants. Unlike Abu Ghraib and in a fashion closer to the uses of images in the 
invasion of Iraq, the institutional appropriation of private images performs ideological 
functions, re-construing the event in relation to the themata (e.g. clash of civilizations) 
activated by 9/11. At least as experienced in Western media the visual coverage of the 
Arab Spring construes and celebrates digital visuality as a technology of freedom which 
allows both the political exposure of authoritarian regimes (reality principle and truth 
claim of images) and the mobilization against them (pleasure principle and community 
building). Digital technology/visuality are represented as “democratic” and digital 
camera as democratic “weapons” against undemocratic regimes (BBC, 2011a) (BBC, 
2011b). It can be argued that while the democratic nature of digital technology is 
disputed by digital surveillance in US, China, Iran etc., the idea that digital camera can 
be effective “weapons” against undemocratic regimes is a dangerous metaphor that 
recognizes the instrumental value of visual communication but misconstrues the 
conditions of its efficacy: it gives power not to unorganized masses but to the agents or 
the political actors that can make a politically effective use of images. We see pictures 
taken by the people directly experiencing those events on BBC or CNN because those 
images have been appropriated by these organizations and because the regimes affected 
by the “Arab Spring” do not yet have the capacity neither to control the circulation of 
digital images nor to mount an effective counter-campaign. In this sense one may 
indeed claim that these regimes surely underestimated the communicative potential of 
digital visuality. Quite obviously, this is something else than claiming that digital 
cameras are the weapons of democracy: digital images and technology are 
“weaponized”, only if and when used by influential actors in coordinated visual 
strategy.  
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Anchoring 
The coverage of the US led invasion of Iraq in BBC World and CNN International 
participated to the socio-institutional effort of constructing the war as an act of justice 
which repressed a more fundamental need of revenge.  Institutional discourse anchored 
the experience of 9/11 as an act of war, a humiliation and ultimately a trauma for 
American national identity comparable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941: 
a shock whose detrimental effects on the collective identity could be overcome or 
healed only with the total defeat and humiliation of the offender2. Although the 
anchoring of the US led invasion of Iraq war in terms of revenge seems plausible, my 
suggestion is that, at least in the institutional forms of BBC World and CNN 
International war coverage, the visual representation of the invasion was inspired by the 
need of repressing, rather than expressing, the revenge motives. I am using the term 
“repressing” and not “concealing” here because “denial” seems a more plausible term 
than “lying” when discussing the responses to traumas threatening collective identities. 
Not only a war of revenge would have undermined the politics of war, but “justice” is 
preferable to “revenge” as a motive in the self-representation and legitimation of US as 
a “policeman”.   
 
The images of Abu Ghraib are an ambivalent proof of the abuses and of the repressed 
desires of revenge. They can be enjoyed or rejected as a continuation of the “visual 
pleasure” from the war, but also enjoyed or rejected as the unveiling of the repression at 
work in the visual construction of the war – disturbing because it showed the “true 
nature” of US intervention: not bringing justice in the name of the “international 
community” but satisfying the frustrated need of revenge for the humiliation inflicted by 
the attacks of 9/11. The anchoring process itself takes different connotations depending 
on the social functions one attributes to visual communication. As proof of the abuses, 
those images can be interpreted and used for their truth claim based on the “reality 
principle”: the idea that digital images can show events more directly and efficiently 
than other forms or representation. As proof of repressed desires of revenge, however, 
those images are associated to the “pleasure principle” and the idea that the 
correspondence between the images and the reality is less important than the 
relationship created among individuals that give those images a particular meaning. In 
this perspective, as visual representations of repressed desires of revenge – along ethnic, 
cultural, political and even gender lines - the images of Abu Ghraib perform community 
building functions. They did so as empirical objects whose relevant social meaning is 
construed through oppositional anchoring: one either enjoys the sight of humiliation or 
feels humiliated. Looked through the lenses of the “war on terror” and the polarization 
of political identities (“with us or against us”), the images of Abu Ghraib provided the 
opportunity to engage the constitution of social identities on hetero-referential (Sen & 
Wagner, 2005) and emotional grounds (Höijer, 2010): If you enjoy the sight you are 
with us; If you feel humiliated you are against us.  
 
From a political point of view, however, the constitution of identity on emotional 
grounds creates more problems than it solves, especially if the goal is to overcome the 
traumatic effects of 9/11 on US/Western and possibly Islamic identities. By enforcing 
                                                 
2 The campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan probably did not offer a victory comparable to that on Japan and 
Iraq become a suitable scapegoat. Not by chance, as the peace treaty with Japan in 1945 was signed on the USS 
Missouri, Bush delivered is “victory speech” from the USS Abraham Lincoln 2003. 
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emotional anchoring on social categorization (the distinction between in-group and out-
group), and coupling or “tying up” feelings with loyalties, the possibility opens up for 
(in)voluntary violations of the in-group/out-group divides. In practice, some of “us” 
may indeed feel humiliated and may decide to actually leave the “in-group” as 
construed in the oppositional representation of the West/US capitalism vs. Islam. The 
cleavage those images created within the “US/West” collective identity is an important 
one and its political implications should not be underestimated. Politicians can tell 
people what to think and be more or less successful in their propaganda efforts. But 
when it comes to the problem of how to feel the task seems more complicated and 
indeterminacy more influential. 
 
The images of Abu Ghraib where also re-appropriated. Cultural re-appropriation can be 
considered as a form of communicative behavior symptomatic of a collective need to 
come to terms with the visual evidence of an event that undermines the in-group 
cohesion and the representation of collective identity possibly more than the event itself. 
In one of such instances of re-appropriation, Columbian artist Fernando Botero offers a 
visualization of the abuses to produce an explicit association with Picasso’s Guernica 
based on the conceptualization of art as “permanent accusation”3 In another instance, 
the re-appropriation of the images of Abu Ghraib in the form of fetishist practices is a 
form of ambivalent anchoring that subverts the relationship between the victim and the 
victimizer from one of “abuse” to one of “complicity”. Also in this case the pleasure 
principle is at work and the relation of meaning among the members of the in-group is 
prioritized over the relationship between the image and the event it portrays (reality 
principle). I should add that both these instances of cultural re-appropriation of the 
images of Abu Ghraib are also acts of visual displays whose intelligibility depends on 
the images of abuses that institutionalizes the normative function of art, in one instance, 
and the subversion of the victim-victimizer relationship in terms of mutual pleasure in 
the other. While the former performs conventional or “modern” esthetic functions (e.g. 
the hypostatization of the abuses in a work of art), the latter is more compatible with the 
consumerist styles that Frederic Jameson attributes to the cultural logic of late 
capitalism (Jameson, 1991): the decoupling of the signifiers (photo of abuses) from the 
signified (the abuses) and the repositioning of the latter in the domain of fetishism as a 
private and rightful enjoyment. 
 
The anchoring in terms of revenge applies equally well to the relevant social meaning of 
those images in expressing repressed desires but also in feeding more or less conscious 
desires of revenge, especially in communities whose identity is associated to the image 
of abused Iraqi soldiers. The images of Abu Ghraib are traumatic also for Arab identity. 
While the nature of this trauma can be looked at in both its cultural and gender 
connotations, it would be interesting to look deeper into how those images and the event 
they refer to generates social representation as a defensive response for example through 
the visualization of revenge (Filkins, 2004).4  
 
If 9/11 is considered an event that triggers a collective representational need (which I 
discuss here in terms of the social construction of visual meaning), the concept of 
                                                 
3 See Fernando Botero at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernando_Botero (last visited 22.02.2012 
4 The idea of revenge, like the themata of the ‘clash of civilizations’ is quite influential and relevant also in the 
discussion about the cultural roots of Islamic terrorism, a most interesting topic addressed by scholars such as Fawaz 
Gerges, Gilles Kepel and Louise Richardson, among others, but one that I cannot discuss here. See, for example 
(Gergez, 2005, pp. 251-277), (Kepel, 2008, p. 33), (Richardson, 2006, p. 71 & ff) 
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revenge opens up some interesting interpretative avenues also in the case of the images 
the Arab “spring”. Those of us old enough to remember the Prague Spring during the 
Cold War, must have wondered what was the ground for the naming of the rebellions in 
some Arab countries as “Arab Spring”. The Prague Spring was an effort to reform 
soviet communism which ended in the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet Union in 
1968. The Arab Spring is a sequence of insurrections against more or less authoritarian 
regimes in some Arab countries which at least in two cases – Libya and Syria – so far, 
has led to civil war and foreign invasions. If on historical grounds, the differences may 
not be as relevant as the similarities, on ideological grounds, however, the association is 
actually quite plausible. The idea of revenge is here construed on the ideological 
dimension of a competition that during the Cold War was between the capitalist West 
against the communist East but that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some believe 
is between the West/US capitalism and Islam.  
 
In this line of interpretation, the images of the Arab “spring” are an act of visual display 
that celebrate the power of the West/US capitalism in both its technological (digital 
cameras that circumvent regimes censorship) and ideological (the advancement of 
democracy) dimensions. In this act, visual communication in general and digital 
visuality in particular, are construed as the tools that allow access to “truth”, 
circumventing the control of local regimes but also offering the technological 
infrastructure for Western media (e.g. BBC International) to re-appropriate those 
images. In this process of re-appropriation the notion of revenge seems a plausible 
interpretative key in terms of both the truth claim and the community building functions 
associated to the usage of (digital) imagery (Stocchetti 2014). In relation to their truth 
claim or the “reality principle”, those images are anchored in the idea that (Western) 
democracy is advancing in those countries. Equipped with digital cameras and other 
communicative tools provided by available (Western) technology, the people of those 
countries are portrayed in the process of “becoming like us” which is itself a sign of the 
hegemonization of American identity threatened by 9/11 and re-defined by the “war on 
terror”. In this perspective the cultural re-appropriation by Western media supports the 
idea of the inevitable advance of (Western) democracy, famously discussed by Francis 
Fukuyama in the aftermath of the Cold War5. In relation to the community building 
function or the “pleasure principle”, those images are anchored in the idea that the 
advancement of democracy - and the transformation of “they” into “us” is actually a 
victory of the West in the clash of civilizations prophesized by Samuel P. Huntington at 
the turn of the century. In the cultural re-appropriation of those images from this 
standpoint, the visual saga of the Gadhafi resistance, escape and eventual assassination 
is an element of particular significance for the anchoring in revenge and one that 
connects the Arab Spring with the invasion of Iraq (the images of dead Saddam and his 
sons) and the “war on terror” (the images of dead Osama Bin Laden). In this anchoring, 
the representation of suffering and the victimization of local population by their rulers 
are appropriated by both the West/US and the Islamists. But if for the West/US the 
victims of the regimes are the proof of the regime’s illegitimacy, for local Arab 
audiences the illegitimacy of the regime does not requires proof and its victims are 
martyrs for Islam. If this would be true, and the social construction of visual suffering in 
the Arab Spring does indeed follow very different anchoring in the West/US compared 
                                                 
5 As a note one can only note the difference in the institutional re-appropriation of the imagery associated to the 
Occupy Wall Street movement that in the very same days of the early Arab Spring, was demonstrating against the 
distortions introduced in the US democracy by financial capitalism. My impression is that while the latter is 
construed as a democratic rebellion the former is construed as a civic disturbance. 
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to local audiences, the anchoring in term of revenge and the cultural re-appropriation in 
the terms of “necessary” or “enforced” advancement of democracy by Western media 
would have performed at least one important (dis)function of propaganda: blinding 
domestic publics to the fact that the insurrections of the Arab Spring paved the way for 
the advance of Islamist organizations. 
 
The main points of my discussion and some questions concerning the role of digital 
visuality are tentatively summarized below6. 
                                                 
6 A special thanks to Inari Sakki for her comments and help in the compilation of this chart.  
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EVENT 9/11 
What is the role of digital visuality 
(DV) in the visual construction of 
the event? 
Main THEMATA WEST/US CAPITALISM vs. ISLAM 
other themata 
GOOD vs. EVIL, DEMOCRACY vs. TERROR/DICTATORSHIP, HUMAN vs. ANIMAL, 
MASCULINE vs. FEMININE 
Can DV activate alternative/emancipative/subversive Themata? 
CONTEXTS Iraq 2003  Abu Ghraib Arab Spring 
 
(themata US-Islam)  (themata human-animal) (themata democracy-dictatorship) 
masculine-feminine  
 Institutional DV  Informal/private DV 
Informal/private DV re-
appropriated by media orgs. 
Can DV resists institutional re-appropriation? 
OBJECTIFICATIONS war/violence  torture, abuses demonstrations 
(most common 
visualizations) 
Saddam/Bin Laden  American soldier twitter, digital camera etc. 
Arab victims Gadhafi 
DV is itself a representation of the West/US capitalism/freedom 
ANCHORS act of war  
enjoyment/disgust  
(emotional anchoring) 
Prague Spring (naming) 
 
trauma/pearl harbour 
fear (emotional anchoring) 
 pleasure, humiliation 
victory of capitalism/democracy, 
superiority of the West 
Common anchoring  
for all cases: 
Revenge 
Can DV influence anchoring? 
IDENTITY  
FUNCTIONS 
re-definition to overcome the 9/11 
trauma 
 Revenge vs. justice 
Reassurance about West/US 
capitalism 
polarization/polemic of American identities (in- and out-groups) 
 
Figure 1. Social representations and visual communication: a provisional conceptual framework 
Stocchetti, M.                                                                                                                           54                          
 
Conclusions 
On a general note, I am indeed tempted to agree with Brian Winston when, in open contrast 
with Marshall McLuhan, he suggested that available technology is not a cause but an effect of 
social order and the “law of the suppression of radical potential” is decisive in making sure 
that technological innovation cannot produce non incremental change or “revolution” in the 
former (Winston, 1986) [see also (Traber, 1986)].  
 
Digital visuality is a form of visual technology with emancipative or even subversive 
potentials to the extent it facilitates the participation of more and more diverse social 
identities, interests and hierarchies of values to the social construction of visual meaning. 
The actual expression of this potential however is far from granted. 
 
Visual communication has distinctive aspects of indeterminacy that in particular 
circumstances (e.g. redefinition of traumatized social identities) creates opportunities for 
emancipation. Hegemonic ideology, however, is productive: it responds actively to 
challenges and can inhibit emancipative potentialities if and when they emerge. The “pure 
and random play of signifiers” (Jameson, 1991, p. 96) which digital visuality seems so 
decisive in bringing about is not a weakness but the very strength of the cultural logic of late 
capitalism, and the very reason of its resistance.  
 
If every signifier were always autonomous from every signified, communication and 
understanding would be simply impossible. In practice, communication and understanding 
happen all the time but, if we are interested in relations of power, we may usefully notice that 
some understandings are more influential than others. To enforce the emancipative potential 
of digital visuality – as well as other forms of communication - we have to gain a better grasp 
on the conditions of this autonomy since, taken in its absolute form, this autonomy reflects an 
epistemological standpoint that undermines the emancipative potential of digital visuality 
because it erodes the ideological impact of diversity in the visual construction of reality but 
not the effects of the hegemonic influences it describes. 
 
If suggesting that “resistance is futile” may perform as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the 
influence of ideological elements in repressing the radical potential of digital visuality should 
not be underestimated. In fact, the autonomy of the signifier, and the commodification of 
culture associated to it, cannot be associated to semantic chaos but rather the hegemonic 
control on the social construction of meaning. While every individual is in principle capable 
of giving meaning - and a given image can be given as many different meanings as there are 
individuals using it - in my discussion I prefer to use the notion of relevant social meaning to 
describe the impermanent outcome of the social construction of visual meaning and to 
capture the influence of ideology in this process. For our discussion, this notion suggests at 
least two important points. First that the meaning of images is constructed not independently 
from, but functionally connected to, the purposes, interests, values, histories, etc. of the most 
influential among the agents participating in the process. Second, that even if the meaning of 
images is ambiguous, disambiguation is possible because the viewers never see images in a 
vacuum. The context of the uses of images contains situational clues that perform like 
interpretative keys for the decoding of the image and disambiguation. This process of 
disambiguation is relevant for the visual construction of reality: the process in which images 
and visual communication are used in the representation of relevant social issues. 
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Abstract: The present research aims to better understand the impact of brand exposure and 
brand perception on logo recall and recognition. Building off of prior work that has examined 
surprising impairments in visual memory for the Apple logo (Blake, Nazarian and Castel, 
2015), a comparative analysis is developed by comparing computer science and social science 
becoming specialists. The Apple logo is used as a case study due to its minimalism. The data 
reveal that only a small amount of the subjects can recall and recognize the Apple logo 
correctly. The recognition phase, in comparison with the recalling one, seems to be an easier 
task for the subjects. However, although the stylized features of the logo are often overlooked, 
each subject manages to recognize a large amount of details of the logo. Contrary to 
expectations, regardless of being a man or a woman, owning an Apple device, or developing a 
very positive emotional attachment to the brand are not significant variables that can determine 
a higher level of recall and recognition. Nevertheless, having a strong background in the 
technological domain can increase the probability of paying much attention to the details of a 
technical brand. 
 




1. Background  
In a world characterized by an inflation of visual inputs, creating and using a minimalist symbol 
for a brand might be an efficient ingredient in marketing. One might claim that the more 
minimalistic an element is, the more recalled and recognized it becomes. This paper presents a 
comparative study between social and computer science students, aiming to assess the level of 
recall and recognition of Apple logo, one of the simplest brand symbols. This study is a 
replication of the study conducted in 2015 by Adam B. Blake, Meenely Nazarian, and Alan D. 
Castel, namely The Apple of the Mind’s Eye: Everyday Attention, Metamemory, and 
Reconstructive Memory for the Apple Logo, published in The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. The original research has as starting point the puzzle based on which 
some scholars are saying that multiple exposure to a certain stimulus can induce an accurate 
recall, while other are arguing the contrary (Blake, Nazarian, Castel, 2015). In this particular 
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sense, the stimulus is the Apple logo, an extremely simple, memorable, and recognizable visual 
information (Farnham, 2013 in Blake, Nazarian, Castel, 2015). Thus, it is expected that this 
logo can be remembered in detail.  
Considering that the original study underlines the inability to draw and recognize the 
minimalistic Apple logo, and thus emphasizing a considerable memory issue, a replication with 
a new sample, in a dissimilar country – Romania aims to provide insights into the robustness 
of effects of the used variables. The replication can show whether there are significant 
similarities between perceptions, regardless of the economical, social, and technological 
context.  
Although developed economies (United Nations, 2017), Romania and the United States 
of America (USA), the latter being the location of the original experiment, differ. Considering 
the topic of the present paper, a relevant dissimilarity between the two countries is related to 
income. While the USA is considered to be a high income country, Romania is an upper middle 
income one (United Nations, 2017). In addition, the purchasing power parity (PPP) is of 18.56 
trillion dollars for the USA and 441 billion dollars for Romania (GFP, 2017). The gross 
domestic product (GDP) is another indicator that differentiates the two countries; measured in 
US dollars, the American GDP is 17.348.072 million, while the Romanian one is 199.045 
million (United Nations, 2016). Whereas the mobile-cellular subscriptions index per 100 
inhabitants is 105.9 units in Romania in comparison with 98.4 units in the USA, the individuals 
using Internet amount up to 54.1% in Romania and 87.4% in the USA (United Nations, 2016). 
Strongly related to the case study in this paper, one significant information estimates that 
iPhone sales to end users, in 2016, are 62.9 million in the USA and 34.6 million in Europe 
(Dunn, 2017)1. Based on the above comparative data, a possible assumption could be that the 
recall and recognition on a technological high-end brand, such as Apple, would be lower in the 
case of Romania.   
In contrast with the original study, the present research adds two new variables to the 
existing ones, namely the sex of the subjects and the specialization. Thus, the paper compares 
men and women, and the social and computer science becoming specialists. On the one hand, 
after studying gender differences, Maccoby and Jacklin claim that there are distinctions 
between the abilities of men and women. While men tend to excel in visual-spatial and 
mathematical abilities, women tend to perform better at verbal abilities (Herlitz, Nilsson, 
Bäckman, 1997: 801). On the other hand, Cattaneo, Postma and Vecchi (2006: 905) stress that 
“gender differences apply only to selective dimensions of spatial functioning.” In addition, 
there are studies that underline that women have a better spatial and object identity memory 
(Voyer et al., 2007) and have a greater ability for tasks, among others, as recall of pictures, 
word recognition, object location etc. (Herlitz, Nilsson, Bäckman 1997: 808). Regarding the 
specialization comparison, to our knowledge, there are no research studying the relationship 
between technical or social expertise and memory recall and recognition. The choice of 
computer science and social science becoming specialists relies on the aim to study two 
opposite groups in terms of background. However, future research can enlarge the number of 
specializations. 
Since it is still believed that 70% of all the purchase decision are made in store (Van 
Grinsven, Das, 2016), using a recognizable logo might become an important visual element in 
marketing. Thus, simple logos, that take little time and little brain capacity to be recognized, 
are preferred (Van Grinsven, Das, 2016). As simplicity is considered one of the most important 
principles in design, it involves the process of removing any unnecessary element (Eytam, 
Tractinsky, Lowengart, 2017). 
                                                 
1 Official data related to iPhone or any other Apple devices sales in Romania are not available.  
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Logos are considered an important visual variable which connects the consumer to the brand 
and to the emotional perceptions (Park, Eisingerich, Pol, Park, 2013). In a market context in 
which the number of logos increases, the individuals’ attention toward brands decreases 
(Rotfeld, 2006 in Sääksjärvi et al., 2015). In this respect, researchers studying logo design 
emphasize the importance of its simplicity and minimalism in order to create a higher level of 
recall and recognition (Pimentel and Heckler 2003 in Sharma, Varki, 2017).  The literature 
assumes that simple elements are easier to be remembered due to their low level of attention 
required and less processing capacity (Van Grinsven, Das, 2016). By studying the specific of 
logo design on brand recognition, Henderson and Cote (1998 in Van Grinsven, Das, 2016) 
claim that, for a higher rate of recognition, a logo should have a natural and harmonious design. 
Logos are associated with familiarity, identity, meaning, and likeability (Pimentel and Heckler 
2003 in Sharma, Varki, 2017), and are responsible for cognitive and affective coding processes 
in linking the somatic markers to the brand (Sharma, Varki, 2017). Starting from the concept 
of polarizing brands (Monahan, Espinosa, Ortinau, 2017), Apple can be considered a brand 
that is either hated or loved. 
Prior exposure to a stimulus, a logo for instance, predisposes an individual to that 
stimulus at a later time (Janiszewski and Meyvis, 2001). The processing fluency/attribution 
model claims that repeated exposure to a stimulus leads to a representation of the stimulus in 
the memory. Thus, at a later time, the memory will facilitate the encoding process and will 
make it more fluent, effortless, and unconscious (in Janiszewski and Meyvis, 2001: 19).  
Considering the large amount of messages to which a consumer is exposed every day, 
all the received information is impossible to be consciously processed. Thus, attention becomes 
an expensive and limited resource (Milosavljevic, Cerf, 2008; Teixeira, 2014). Murray et al. 
(2013) claim that “attention, when directed to items already encoded in memory, improves the 
probability of their recall but does not increase the precision with which they are represented.” 
In this respect, the Apple logo can be considered minimalistic and easy to be remembered and 
recognized.  
Referring to the concept of mental effort, Kahneman (2011) believes that, in most cases, 
it can be considered non-comfortable. Therefore, individuals prefer to rely on intuition, 
attaching a high degree of trust to it. One of the most well-known experiments is the bat-and-
ball puzzle. Shane Frederick, together with Kahneman (2011), has conducted an experiment in 
which the subjects have to solve a very simple math problem. As expected, more than 50% tend 
to give an intuitive incorrect answer. One of the explanation refers to the fact that people choose 
intuition over rationality, mainly because the task seems to be too simple (Kahneman, 2011). 
The same context can hold up in the case of the Apple logo, which is perceived as one of the 
simplest logos. In the same respect, increased exposure can lead to an increased level of 
recognition (Van Grinsven, Das, 2016). While talking about the preference for simplicity, the 
level of involvement of the individual should be brought into discussion. A person owning an 
Apple product, or wishing for one, is perhaps more likely to pay more attention to a detail 
regarding the brand logo.  
 
Based on the above literature, the present paper begins from the following hypotheses: 
H1, H2: Males, in comparison with females (H1), and computer science, in comparison 
with social science becoming specialists (H2), are more likely to develop a better recall 
and recognition of the Apple logo. 
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As stated above, there is a puzzle in the literature regarding whether recall and recognition 
abilities can be better performed by men or women. Thus, assuming that men are more 
interested in technology and are more visually oriented, we claim that men will better recall 
and recognize the stimulus.  
In the same respect, considering the everyday context, computer science students are 
believed to pay much more attention to technology and to its details. By being interested in 
state-of-the-art technology, it is assumed that computer science students own Apple devices to 
a higher degree than social science ones or are more keen on them. Thus, by being in contact 
with an Apple device more often, computer science becoming specialists might recall the logo 
more accurately. 
 
H3, H4: Individuals owning an Apple device (H3) and individuals loving the Apple brand   
(H4) are more likely to remember (recall and recognition) the logo of the brand 
correctly. 
In this case, we expect that by being exposed to the Apple logo more often than non-
users, the users will be more capable of drawing and recognizing the logo correctly. 
Moreover, by developing a positive emotional association with the brand, individuals 
are considered to pay much more attention to the details of the brand. 
 
H5, H6: The confidence level for the recall and recognition phases is higher in the case of  
Apple owners (H5) and of the lovers of the brand (H6). 
 
Owning an Apple device, thus being more connected with a logo, individuals are 
believed to be more self-confident when recalling and recognizing the Apple logo. 
This study can be considered a preamble for further attempts to analyze the impact of 
brand exposure and brand perception on recall and recognition. At the same time, taking into 
account the case study of the minimalist Apple logo, further research can comparatively 
investigate a larger number of brands’ logos, and can emphasize the importance of simplicity 







The experiment was conducted on a number of 198 subjects, out of which 78 are social science 
students from the Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania (communication, public 
relations, advertising, and journalism) and 120 computer science students from the Technical 
University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Out of the total sample, 119 are female subjects. Age 
range is 18-27, ME=22.4. From the total number of respondents, 27.8% own an iPhone, 5.6% 
own a Mac, 2.5% own an iPad, and 2.5% own an iPod. Only 5 respondents are strictly Apple 




From a methodological standpoint, the present paper is a slight replication of the article entitled 
The Apple of the Mind’s Eye: Everyday Attention, Metamemory, and Reconstructive Memory 
for the Apple Logo (Blake, Nazarian, Castel, 2015).  
Iancu, I. and Iancu, B.                                                                                                               61 
 
The original study employs two different experimental designs. The first experiment 
has the following steps: drawing the logo of the Apple brand on a blank sheet of paper, rating 
the confidence level of the accuracy of the drawing on a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1 is low 
level of confidence and 10 high level of confidence), identifying the right Apple logo from a 
set of 8 figures, and rating the confidence level of the choice on a scale from 1 to 10 10 (where 
1 is low level of confidence and 10 high level of confidence). The second experiment is similar 
to the first one, with the exception of asking the subjects to rate the confidence of being able to 
draw the logo before drawing it as well (Blake, Nazarian, Castel, 2015).  
As the main above described steps have been followed in the present study, the main 
differences from the original paper are the following. First, a single experimental design is 
employed, one that implies the evaluation of the confidence level both before and after drawing 
the logo, and after the identification of the right logo from the given figures. The reason for 
choosing this design relies on the aim of analyzing in a more complex manner the metacognitive 
changes in the participants. Second, considering the task in which the subjects are asked to 
recognize the right logo from a given set of figures, there have been used 12 situations, instead 
of 8. Thus, the goal is that of creating an even more difficult context. Third, after the 
experiment, the subjects were asked to answer to a more enlarged set of questions for assessing 
the perception over the Apple brand. The main steps followed in the present experiment are 





In this phase, the subjects were asked to solve three tasks. First, with no visual connection to 
any Apple device or other identification pattern, the subjects, faced with the imaginary situation 
of drawing the Apple logo, had to rate their level of confidence that they would draw it accurate. 
A scale from 1 to 10 was used (where 1 is low level of confidence and 10 high level of 
confidence) to this purpose. Second, without being exposed to the previous given rating, the 
subjects were asked to draw the shape of the Apple logo. Finally, they were asked to evaluate 
their level of confidence regarding the drawing on a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1 is low level of 




In the second phase, the subjects were asked to choose the right Apple logo shape from a given 
set of 12 figures. One set of used figures is presented in the following table. Similarly to the 
original study, there were no logos around the experiment room, and the location of the correct 
logo in the given set of figures was different each time. After the recognition task, the subjects 
assessed the level of confidence for their choice on a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1 is low level 








Table 1. The variations of Apple logos used in the experiment (in this case, the last one is the 
right logo) 
 




Use of the brand 
 
The third phase of the experiment refers to the use of the Apple devices. Thus, the respondents 
were asked to name the brand of their phone and computer. At the same time, they were asked 
whether they own other Apple devices, such as iPad, iPod or Apple Watch. Another question 
refers to the situation in which the subject does not own an iPhone; they were asked if they ever 
owned an iPhone. The data show that there are only few subjects that own other Apple devices 
than the iPhone. Therefore, in the data analysis, the idea of owning an iPhone is much more 
considered that owning other Apple devices. 
 
Perception of the brand  
 
The last phase completes the above information with the perception of the Apple brand in order 
to correlate it with brand recall and recognition. Thus, the main questions refer to the first word 
coming to mind when hearing the name of the Apple brand, to what degree they would like to 
own Apple devices (iPhone, Mac, iPad, iPod, and Apple Watch), to what degree they love the 
Apple brand, and how satisfactory they find several aspects related to Apple products 
(innovation, quality, security, affordability, technical support, size of the device, design of the 
device, technical performance, battery life, and connection – available posts). 
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Within the recall phase, there were initiated three tasks to be completed: self-evaluation of the 
level of confidence before drawing the logo, the logo drawing, and self-evaluation of the level 
of confidence after drawing the logo. The most important task is that of drawing the Apple 
logo, from memory, without any visual influence. In this respect, 18.8% (37 respondents) of 
the individuals manage to draw the logo perfectly2. The entire range of the drawing criteria are 
presented in the table below. 
 


















(% from the total 
computer science) 
The drawing is correct 18.8 14.2 25.6 12.9 22.5 
General shape      
Bottom not smooth 57.4 53.7 62.8 58.4 56.6 
Top not smooth 91.9 91.5 92.3 89.6 93.3 
A leaf present 99 99.1 98.7 100 98.3 
No stem present 99 100 97.4 100 98.3 
Stylized features      
Bite       
Bite present 96.4 96.6 96.1 92.2 99.1 
Bite size 80.7 75.6 88.4 64.9 90.8 
Bite on the right 83.2 82.3 84.6 74 89.1 
Absence of teeth marks 97 95.7 98.7 93.5 99.1 
Leaf       
Leaf shape 74.6 73.1 76.9 66.2 80 
Leaf orientation 57.4 52.9 64.1 46.7 64.1 
Absence of vein in leaf 99 98.3 100 98.7 99.1 
Leaf floating 60.4 57.1 65.3 64.9 57.5 
 
As the above data show, the respondents do remember separate details of the logo pretty 
clearly, but they do not manage to put all of them together. While almost all of the subjects 
remember that there is leaf and a bite present, and that the top of the logo is not smooth, only 
around half of them manage to represent a nonsmooth bottom. Regarding the bite, more than 
80% remember the size of the bite and the fact that it is placed on the right side of the logo. 
Considering the leaf, while more than 70% manage to draw the leaf correctly, a little bit more 
than half remember the orientation and that fact that it is floating. Therefore, it can be said that 
although there are very few individuals that manage to remember the entire logo correctly, there 
is an unexpectedly high amount of respondents that remember many details.  




Table 3. Sample drawings from the recall phase and the level of confidence before and after 
the drawing 
 
                                                 
2 When claiming that the logo was drawn perfectly, it means that all the components of the logo were correctly 
considered. In most of the cases, the logo does not totally overlap with the original shape, due to different drawing 
procedures or talents. However, all theses drawings were regarded as correct, because they meet all the established 
criteria. 




As the table shows, the drawing features vary significantly. For all the subjects, it is clear that 
the logo of the Apple brand represents an apple. However, based on the individual talent and 
level of recall, the features are different. In addition, the above sample show the way the level 
of confidence evolves from the moment before the drawing to the moment after the drawing. 
There can be mentioned several situations: the level of confidence stagnates, the level of 
confidence increases or the level of confidence decreases. Nonetheless, it is interesting to 
observe how the level of confidence fluctuates, taking into account the way the logo is drawn. 
There are cases in which the logo is meaningfully biased, but the level of confidence is very 
high. In the same respect, there are cases in which the logo is almost perfectly drawn, but the 
level of confidence is very low or decreases. 
Although there is indeed a higher percentage of men drawing the logo correctly, when 
it comes to details, the differences between the two sexes are minimal. Pretty significant 
differences can be observed only in the case of the smoothness of the bottom, of the bite size, 
of the leaf orientation, and of the leaf floating. Yet, this does not mean that the hypothesis is 
validated.  
A pretty similar situation resides in the case of specialization. Although the expectation 
shows that a computer science background would lead to a better recall of the details of 
technological symbol, the differences between social and computer science are not significant. 
While computer scientists have better capacity to recall the bite size and location, the leaf shape 
and orientation, the social scientists better recall the idea of a floating leaf. It can be emphasized 
that computer science specialists might be more keen on visual identities belonging to 
technology. However, this hypothesis must be further tested. 
In order to assess a broader overview on the data, the capacity of drawing the logo correctly is 
correlated with other variables as well. Thus, while correlated with the level of confidence 
before drawing the logo, only 4 individuals (10.8%) rate themselves with the grade 10, 8 
individuals with 9 (21.6%), and 7 with 8 (18.9%). The majority of the people drawing the logo 
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perfectly rate themselves with 7 (24.3%). However, a correlation between these two variables 
is not significant. 
Starting from the premise that the level of confidence can grow after the drawing 
execution, the data show that, this time, the majority of respondents drawing the logo perfectly 
rate themselves with the grade 8 (27%). The ones graded with 10 are only 3 (8.1%), the ones 
graded with 9 are 6 (16.2%), similar with the case of grade 7 (Contingency Coefficient=.275, 
sig.=.064).  
Out of the people that drew the logo perfectly, 81.1% chose the right logo among the 
given figures (Phi.=.402, sig.=.000). Interestingly, 43.2% out of those drawing a perfect logo 
rate themselves with the grade 10 for the level of confidence after choosing the logo. However, 
we cannot talk of a strong correlation between these two variables. 
Regarding the brand of the phone they own, 27% from the ones that draw the logo 
perfectly own an iPhone, while 37.8% own a Samsung3. Thus, one cannot say that owning a 
device from a certain brand does necessarily imply remembering the details of the logo in all 
its details. In the same respect, the level of love for the brand has no significant correlation with 
the recall of the logo. More than half of the participants drawing the logo perfectly (56.7%) 
claim that they love the Apple brand only to a small degree or not at all.  
  Concluding, one cannot infer that there is a certain mix of variables that determine the 
capacity of recalling a simplistic logo perfectly. Moreover, while there is no emphasized detail, 
one cannot predict which details are going to be better remembered. The data also show that 
there is no relevant correlation between the recall and recognition of the logo and the level of 
satisfaction with the brand. 
Considering the recognition phase, from the total number of subjects, 39.9% manage 
to choose the right logo from the given alternatives. Comparing this percentage with the one 
reflecting the subjects drawing the logo correctly, one can notice a significant increase. Thus, 
it can be admitted that, while having a visual aid, although there is a wide range of incorrect 
alternatives, the choice is easier. Most probably, through existing visual comparison, the 
subjects do recall several features better. 
 




(% from the 
total females) 
Males 
(% from the 
total males) 
Social science 




(% from the total 
computer science) 
The choice is correct 39.9 42 36.7 40.2 40 
 
When correlating the recognition phase with sex and specialization, the data show a similar 
situation as in the case of recall. However, a pretty important difference resides in the fact that 
women tend to better recognize the Apple logo. When it comes to specialization, almost the 
same percentage of social and computer scientists choose the right logo. 
 The capacity to recognize the correct logo is not significantly correlated with the level 
of love for the brand. It can only be said that 34 (17.17% from the total number of the subjects) 
from the ones choosing the right logo love the brand to a high and very high degree. In the same 
respect, although expecting a different result, owning an iPhone does not predict a better 
recognition capacity. 
Comparing the logo recall and the logo recognition phases, the data show that out of the total 
number of subjects, 37 draw the correct logo and choose the right one at the same time. 
Moreover, 10 individuals recall the logo correctly, but do not recognize the right one. 
                                                 
3 The rest of the specified brands do not have significant percentages. That is the reason why only Apple and 
Samsung are mentioned in the analysis. 
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Besides recall and recognition, the level of confidence is an important variable that can 
generate knowledge on human behavior. The level of confidence was tested in three different 
moments of the experimental approach: before drawing the Apple logo, after drawing the Apple 
logo and after choosing the Apple logo. The following figure shows, in a comparative manner, 
the fluctuation of the level of confidence in the recall phase. 
 
Figure 1. A comparison between the level of confidence in the recall phase (before drawing 
the logo and after drawing the logo) 
 
There is a higher number of individuals that rate themselves within the top part of the 
confidence scale (grades between 7 and 10). In the case of the level of confidence before the 
drawing, the grades are, in general, higher than in the case of the level of confidence after 
drawing the logo. This situation can be explained through a higher level of desirable self trust 
before knowing that one is going to be asked to perform a task than after seeing the results of 
the task (the drawing per se).  
In the case of the level of confidence in the recognition phase, the average grade is even 
higher than in the case of the recall phrase, as it can be seen in Figure 2 (ME before drawing = 
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before and after drawing the Apple logo 
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The explanation might be at least dual. On the one hand, after passing the first task of drawing 
the logo, individuals might become self-trustier. On the other hand, being able to actually see 
the logo variations, although being exposed to eleven incorrect alternatives, the subjects might 
believe their choice is accurate, especially in comparison with other given logo alternatives. 
The level of confidence before drawing the logo is positively and strongly correlated 
with the level of confidence after drawing the logo (Spearman=.742, sig.=.000). It implies that 
individuals tend to be consistent with the grades they have used for assessing the recall of the 
logo before and after drawing it. A similar situation seems to be present when it comes to 
correlating the recall levels of confidence with the recognition level of confidence. While the 
correlation between the level of confidence before drawing and the level of confidence after 
the choice has the coefficient Spearman of .614 (sig.=.000), the correlation between the level 
of confidence after drawing and the level of confidence after choosing has the coefficient 
Spearman of .556 (sig.=.000). The respondents do not seem to be significantly biased when 
being shown variations of the logo. They tend to assess themselves in the recognition situation 
in a similar manner as in the case of the recall situation. 
When the “love for the brand” variable is introduced in the analysis, the data show that 
it is significant, but poorly correlated with the level of confidence before the drawing 
(Spearman=.184, sig.=.010) and after the choice (Spearman=.163, sig.=.022). Therefore, the 
cult for the brand does not necessarily imply a high level of confidence on recalling and 
recognition of the Apple brand. 
Although the data show no significant correlation between owning an iPhone and the 
level of confidence before drawing the logo, one can emphasize that there are 72.7% iPhone 
owners with confidence levels higher than 7, by contrast to only 58% non-owners with the same 
confidence level. In this case, it might be said that, rarely, owning an Apple device gives a user 
the confidence that they recall the details of the logo properly.  
However, regarding the level of confidence after drawing the logo, owning an Apple 
device does not make the difference. The same amount of individuals (43.6%) from each 
category (owners and non-owners) has a level of confidence higher that 7. Contrary to 
expectations, there are no significant correlations between the levels of confidence, before and 




















mean before drawing mean after drawing mean after the choice
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The original study finds that although there is a poor level of recall and recognition, the subjects 
seem to be confident in their performance, probably due to the simplistic perception of the 
Apple logo. Thus, usually, the individuals tend to think that they will perform better than they 
actually do (Blake, Nazarian, Castel, 2015). Although there has been introduced a wider range 
of variables (as sex or specialization), the present study comes to similar conclusions. There is 
a small amount of individuals that are able to correctly recall and recognize the logo of Apple 
brand. However, although there are very few individuals that manage to remember the entire 
logo accurately, there is an unexpectedly high amount of respondents that remember many 
features of the logo. 
The level of recognition is higher than the level of recall. A possible explanation might 
be that, while visualizing a set of varieties of the same logo, although almost all incorrect, the 
probability to recall features of the original logo increases.  
Another interesting result shows that the average level of confidence decreases in the 
first two moments of the experimental approach. Thus, on a scale from 1 to 10, it evolves from 
6.79 before drawing to 5.85 after drawing. In this respect, after being asked to actually draw 
the Apple logo, and after seeing it is not an easy as expected task, it is likely that the subject 
will become more self-conscious. In the case of the recognition phase, the average level of 
confidence is even higher than initially (7.69), meaning again that, if the logos are visible, 
although incorrect, the self-trust is higher. 
Although it was expected that men and computer scientists would perform better in both 
recall and recognition phases, the data show no significant correlation between these variables 
(H1 and H2 are invalidated). The same situation fits for the owners of Apple devices and lovers 
of the brand (H3 and H4 are invalidated). They do not seem to have better competencies in 
drawing and recognizing the Apple logo. However, there is a slight positive correlation between 
Apple owners and lovers and the level of confidence (H5 and H6 partially validated). This 
implies that by owning an iPhone for instance, the subjects develop a higher level of self-
confidence related to the features of the owned brand. 
If we were to extrapolate these specific conclusions, one might say that, in the case of a 
minimalist element, whether it is a marketing symbol or something else, the combination of 
variables that can lead to recalling and recognizing those elements should be further 
investigated in a wider range of contexts. The premise stating that the level of minimalism of 
an element is positively correlated with recall and recognition needs supplementary analysis. 
For instance, by increasing the number of analyzed logos, the relevance of minimalism in 
marketing, especially for marketing specialist and logo designers, can be more 
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Preprints are one of publishing’s hottest talking topics. Having seen a strengthening of 
investment by several entities and publishers in 2016, both 2016 and 2017 have witnessed a 
tsunami of new preprint servers, as well as chatter about a centralized preprint service. 
However, while all this buzz is taking place, few are focusing on the possible ethical aspects 
of preprints. In January of 2017, Jeffrey Beall’s blog became extinct, and lists of journals and 
publishers that were harshly criticized for publishing poor research, not conducting peer review 
and for processing research instantly, formed part of what had been termed “predatory journals 
and publishers.” During this period, there has been a boom in preprint servers. Preprints are 
raw findings and data sets that have not been peer reviewed, scientifically vetted, or verified 
for potential errors, flaws, and even fraud, but that are in general superficially selected by an 
advisory board and released to the public within as little as 24 hours. Will this boom in preprints 
and preprint servers serve as an outlet for poor science and unscholarly work to enter 
mainstream literature? In other words, could preprints be a form of predatory publishing? Since 
not all preprints will reach the mainstream literature following regular peer review, and may 
represent the final state of that document, there is a real risk, given that different preprint servers 
have different regulatory bodies, that academically unsound and/or scientifically invalid work 
may flood preprint servers that are emerging at an unprecedented rate. Although preprints 
should be celebrated for bringing research faster to the public, and while preprint proponents 
are lauding preprints as one solution to the replication crisis, what is not being discussed is 
whether preprints pose any ethical or academic risks. 
 
Key words: arXiv; ASAPbio; bioRxiv; Center for Open Science; F1000Research; Gates Open 
Research; peer review; preprint server; quality control; Wellcome Open Research 
 
The age of preprints: hot buzz 
Biomedical science publishing has entered a highly transformative state. Facing threats of 
many fake elements, including fake data, fake authors, fake peer reviews (Teixeira da Silva, 
2017a), and hit by a deluge of errata and retractions as a result of a replication crisis or poorly 
vetted literature caused by permeable peer review, the publishing industry is seeking rapid, 
innovative and robust methods to shore up trust, and to restore quality control to an image-
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damaged sector where trust in academic findings is starting to run thin. Preprints have been 
around since 1991, in the form of arXiv1, and even though many academics have always 
informally shared unpublished documents among trusted colleagues to gain insight and to 
improve their papers prior to submission to a regular academic journal for peer review, 
preprints were never popular with biomedical scientists, who saw little value and, despite the 
delays, preferred to slog through the regular peer review process to see their intellectual work 
validated by peers prior to publication. arXiv even has a section Quantitative Biology that is 
dedicated to theoretical biology, but even that has not attracted much attention2. That lack of 
popularity is because work that is published in a preprint has not been academically validated 
by peers and should not be cited, except for exceptional cases, because citation of non-vetted 
material may corrupt the scholarly record (Teixeira da Silva, 2017b). 
 
The biggest example of the failure of preprints, and to some extent open peer review, to 
capture the attention of biomedical scientists was the termination of Nature Precedings in April 
20123. The reason for the termination of this preprint server was “unsustainability”, but no 
detailed explanations were ever provided by the publisher, Nature Publishing Group, i.e., if 
that unsustainability was academic or financial? However, ever since a replication crisis began 
to emerge in the past few years, preprints have been increasingly marketed as one solution to 
increase reproducibility (Berg et al., 2016), as well as a rapid solution to the slow process of 
traditional peer review and sometimes endless cycles of reject-and-resubmit (Teixeira da Silva 
and Dobránszki, 2015), causing a rise in trend in the number of preprints and preprint servers 
for the biological sciences (Callaway, 2017). By virtue of the fact that greater exposure of these 
“raw” documents that have not been formally academically vetted by professionals, i.e., 
preprints, will supposedly be screened by a wider public audience for errors, following 
resubmission to a valid peer reviewed academic journal for publication in a final state, 
proponents of preprints claim that the final published paper may have a higher degree of 
scientific confidence than papers that have passed through regular peer review only4. However, 
these proponents provide no data or evidence to suport this claim. Preprints have become a hot 
topic in biomedical publishing to a large extent because the replication crisis has become a hot 
topic in biomedical publishing (Kaiser, 2017), and not because they offer any more intrinsic 
academic value than they would have 5 or 10 years ago. Preprints have thus become marketed 
as a replication-fixing tool and a challenge to controversial findings (Kaiser, 2017). Annesley 
and Scott (2017), who interviewed core proponents of the preprint movement (Hilda Bastian, 
Vivian Fonseca, John P.A. Ioannidis, Michael A. Keller, and Jessica Polka), disclosed how so 
much still remains unknown about the future of preprints, and many lingering doubts and 
potential risks, including the possibility of introducing “junk science” into the literature, the 
possible usurpation of preprints by for-profit commercial publishers as a new model to generate 
authors and revenues, and a debate whether the vestigial document, i.e., the preprint, should be 
eliminated once the document becomes published in a final version. While some of the preprint 
proponents in that paper advocate that preprints should carry as much weighting as a meeting 
abstract on a CV, others such as Desjardins-Proulx et al. (2013) argue that for early career 
scientists, preprints should have much greater weighting. Little or no attention has been paid 
to possible unscholarly or unethical aspects of preprints. This is the focus of this commentary 
and opinion piece. 
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Massive investments in preprints 
A major historical point of inflection for the cementation of preprints was likely in February of 
2016, at an ASAPbio meeting5 with many attendees of major publishers and organizations 
related to the publishing industry and owners of preprint servers. ASAPbio is more than an 
initiative, it is a powerful, well-funded lobbying group pushing passionately for the use and 
implementation of preprints in academic publishing. Since that meeting, preprints have been 
increasingly promoted, including by many influential members of the academic and publishing 
communities, such as Berg et al. (2016). Competition and rivalries have also begun to emerge 
which the first author has dubbed “the preprint wars” because each preprint proponent is 
seeking to inject influence and guarantee their slice of the new and emerging preprint “market” 
(Teixeira da Silva, 2017c). Some key events include the approval by Crossref of the indexing 
of preprint digital object identifiers, or DOIs6, the funding of preprint servers by philanthropic 
groups, such as bioRxiv by the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative7 or multiple new preprint servers 
by the Open Science Framework (Center for Open Science, or COS)8, the development of 
preprint servers for exclusive use by researchers who are grantees, such as the Wellcome Open 
Research9 or Gates Open Research10 preprint servers, both of which rely on F1000Research 
functionality, or the increasing calls for an integrated and centralized preprint service 11 . 
Although these are not an exhaustive perspective of the changing world of preprints, and an 
evolving preprint market with increasingly specialized niches, it begins to show that in the 
space of less than two short years, how elements of the biomedical publishing community has 
been investing very heavily, in resources, finances and infrastructure, to prepare for a flood of 
papers that have not been fully academically vetted. These entities have hedged their bets that 
preprints will be widely embraced and used by the biomedical community. Generally, in the 
current preprint model, a preprint server receives documents from scientists that are initially 
screened by an advisory board, and may be placed online in public view within as little as 24 
hours, making this a strong marketing ploy, as a positive pseudo-academic aspect, by preprint 
advocates. However, little attention is being paid to the academic and ethical consequences, or 
possibilities, which are explored in a bit more detail next. Now that there are a sufficient 
number of preprint servers to merit a centralized preprint search engine, discussion is underway 
about a centralized preprint server, similar to a platform like PubMed (Callaway, 2017), with 
a consortium of powerful and influential funders standing behind this massive push for such 
preprint centralization12. 
 
What academic or ethical risks can preprints pose? 
Although voices of concern, skepticism or critique about preprints are mainly limited to blogs 
and Twitter, usually drowned out or shot down by pro-preprint advocates with clearly great 
invested interests, the first major organization to object to the use of preprints in grant 
applications as a collective voice of academics was The Federation of American Societies for 
Experimental Biology (FASEB). In a publicly displayed open letter directed to the National 









12 https://wellcome.ac.uk/news/preprints-were-supporting-calls-central-service (The Wellcome Trust lists the following 
members of the pro-preprint central service consortium: Alfred P Sloan Foundation, Canadian Institutes for Health Research, 
Department of Biotechnology (India), European Research Council, Helmsley Trust, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, 
Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Medical Research Council, National Institutes of Health, Simons Foundation, Wellcome 
Trust) 
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Institutes of Health (NIH), the FASEB President, Hudson H. Freeze, argued that preprints 
would not only overburden an already overburdened peer pool, but would also have a 
“[n]egative effect on rigor and reproducibility of research.”13 Freeze’s position, which claimed 
to represent “30 scientific societies, collectively representing 125,000 biological researchers 
and engineers”, was immediately heavily criticized by many preprint proponents, including 
ASAPbio14 and Lenny Teytelman, the CEO and cofounder of protocols.io15 , two leading 
proponents of preprints and preprint servers that have risen quickly in prominence since 2016. 
All of these events were taking place, curiously, at the time when the Trump 
Administration was set to replace the Obama Administration, and when much movement was 
observed in the NIH, EPA and other US Government agencies related to science and science 
policy. Also, in January of 2017, a blog by Jeffrey Beall went blank. Without any prior notice, 
this blog, which listed journals and publishers with potentially unscholarly and non-academic 
practices, the most prominent being the publication of work and research that had not been 
properly and fully vetted by professionals and peers, referring to them as “predatory”, shut 
down, and the owner, Beall, has yet to offer any suitable response or address the academic and 
ethical consequences of his blog’s closure (Teixeira da Silva, 2017d). Most importantly, for 
this discussion on preprints, is that one of the core arguments made by pro-Beall anti-
“predatory” journal/publisher proponents was that work published in those journals contained 
flaws, inaccuracies or possibly even fraudulent data or research, the “junk science” I allude to 
above, by virtue of the fact that no or little (superficial) peer review had been conducted. Even 
though those lists were highly flawed (Teixeira da Silva, 2017e), Shen and Björk (2015) used 
those flawed lists to estimate that 420,000 articles had been published until 2014 by 8000 
“predatory” open access (OA) journals. In essence, Shen and Björk (2015) insinuated, based 
on a flawed set of lists (Beall’s) and criteria, that 420,000 articles were “junk science”, a 
judgement passed based on the publication venue (journal or publisher) and not on the intrinsic 
scientific or academic merit of each individual paper. Such a mass insinuation is unprecedented 
in the history of academic publishing. Despite this, the Shen and Björk (2015) paper is widely 
praised and cited. 
In this paper, an analogy is drawn between “predatory” publishing, i.e., the publication of 
work in a “predatory” journal that does not conduct peer review or validate the content in a 
scholarly manner, and preprints. Analogous to such criticisms of these “predatory” OA 
journals, preprints, which are also OA, are also not vetted for scientific content or accuracy, 
they are usually approved for broad content and scope by a member of an advisory board, and 
they are released to the public within as little as 24 hours, and at most a week. Thus, the 
unverified state of such literature, which may also contain flaws, inaccuracies or possibly even 
fraudulent data or research, no different to unvetted material published in Beall-listed journals, 
raises valid concerns that preprints may be a high-tech – because their raw and academically 
unvetted nature is masqueraded by glitzy OA servers or platforms – version of “predatory” 
publishing. Another possibility is that, like several of the OA journals and publishers that Beall 
profiled, and which were – and continue to be – lauded as unscholarly by many of the current 
pro-preprint advocates, may be as unscholarly, “predatory” and risky, both to academics and 
society, as the Beall-critiqued OA journals and publishers. This risk of unsound information, 
brought both by poorly vetted “predatory” journals or by academically unvetted preprints, may 
have additional weighting in the medical sciences, such as clinical trials, where actual lives and 
human health is at stake (Loew, 2016; Maslove, 2017). The existence of OA data that has not 
been critically, scientifically or professionally vetted prior to release to the public may further 
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weaken or corrupt the OA scholarly platform, serving as a new threat to the author-pays OA 
publishing model (Al-Khatib and Teixeira da Silva, 2017). Few academics have discussed this 
potential threat. 
This places journals that undergo valid peer review but that accept the submission of 
preprints for peer review in an academic quandary. Firstly, by making an exception to the 1969-
created Ingelfinger Rule (see discussion by Relman, 1981), i.e., that no publication should 
appear twice in a published state, a core value of publication ethics is challenged. Even though 
COPE (Committee of Publication Ethics) and the ICMJE (International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors)16, among other ethics bodies and several biomedical publishers, indicate that 
preprints are an exception to duplicate submission, the ethical and academic premise for this 
exception may now be seriously challenged. The biomedical community, ethics organizations 
and publishers now have to reach a consensus: is a duplicate publication now acceptable, 
whether we refer to it is as a Xerox copy, a modified or amended version, a preprint or a 
published paper in a final state? Until now, the volume of preprints relative to the volume of 
published articles has been tiny, but what happens when the volume of preprints reaches the 
tens or hundreds of thousands of papers, unvetted, with unclear quality and/or unscreened 
errors? Will reprints still be considered as an exception to the ICMJE-defined “duplicate 
submission” or “duplicate publication” rule that forms the bed-rock of publishing ethics, or 
will the concept of duplicate publication fall to the wayside, especially considering that many 
preprints represent the final published state of a paper or research results? The final state of a 
document as a preprint, and hence its rudimentary academic nature, was suggested by several 
of the preprint proponents in the Annesley and Scott (2017) paper. In other words, preprints 
pose an academic risk because they are being over-marketed as some sort of academic savior 
when in fact they present no real academic value whatsoever, except for a quick, cheap and 
easy mode of OA publication. 
As indicated above, new and emerging preprint servers are starting to become increasingly 
specialized, at least in terms of themes, and thus target audiences, which I refer to in this paper 
as “preprint niches”. For example, COS currently has 10 or more subject-based preprint servers 
(in my lexicon, subject = niche): architecture, arts and humanities, business, education, 
engineering, law, life sciences, medicine and health sciences, physical sciences and 
mathematics, social and behavioral sciences. Thus, the COS preprint server engXiv (which 
imitates the original style of Arxiv), as one example, serves the engineering niche. However, 
what will prevent other entities from establishing preprint servers such as engineeringXiv, i.e., 
with similar names, but covering the same subjects? Even worse, since preprints are currently 
academically unregulated, entities might establish sub-niches, such as chemengXiv for 
chemical engineering. In such cases, it is not difficult to envision a situation where a whole 
range of preprint servers will explode onto the preprint “market”, some established by zealous 
or unscholarly entities, simply trying to complete with “valid” or established preprint servers. 
The second analogy here is with the “predatory” OA scholarly publishing market, where the 
efforts of potentially valid scholarly publishers became usurped by unscholarly entities who 
mimic journal titles, publishing platforms and models, to give the impression of a valid 
scholarly journal or publisher, but display “predatory” qualities, aimed exclusively at extracting 
article processing charges, or APCs. 
Regarding APCs, there continues to be a notion that was partially inculcated by Beall that 
one of the predatory qualities of a “predatory” OA journal was that a journal’s APCs are not 
publicly displayed, and that one of the main objectives of such journals, or publishers, was to 
extract profit from unsuspecting authors. However, the author of this commentary has 
published several papers in OA journals that had been listed by Beall as “predatory”, between 
                                                 
16 http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-and-editorial-issues/overlapping-publications.html (see 
criticisms about the ICMJE in Teixeira da Silva 2017h) 
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2015 and 2017, even though APCs had been clearly indicated on those journals’ websites, peer 
review had been suitably conducted, and no APCs had been charged, paid or waivered. So, the 
notion that a new or academically weak OA journal that clearly displays APCs should almost 
automatically receive a “predatory” label needs to be carefully rethought. In fact, a study by 
Bolshete (2017) indicates that 12 out of 13 OA publishers, mainly from Beall’s list, clearly 
displayed their APCs. Even though most preprint servers do not charge APCs to publish a 
preprint, at least not yet (Loew, 2016), there is now a real risk that the “preprint” market will 
explode with valid and also invalid preprint servers, some seeking to exploit the naivety of 
academics, including the potential exploitation of preprint-related APCs, similar to what 
happened during the past decade or so in OA publishing17. There is also increasingly a change 
in paradigm, namely that OA journals that charge low APCs might not deliver a stated service, 
such as peer review, or might only be providing superficial “peer” review, i.e., representing a 
lower stratum of quality, but being erroneously labelled as “predatory”. In other words, there 
is a real risk that a low APC will now be automatically be associated with low academic quality, 
as was insinuated by Beall when he referred to the highly respectable SciELO (Scientific 
Electronic Library Online) platform as a “publishing favela”18, simply because its APCs were 
around 100 US$, and mainly from South American countries, some of which are still 
developing, such as Brazil. Academia thus risks stigmatizing academic OA journals as being 
of poor quality simply because they have no, or low, OA APCs. Similarly, preprints that publish 
any superficially vetted grey literature 19  also risk evolving a unique “predatory” preprint 
market simply because academics might be drawn to the fact that no APC is charged, and find 
it an easy way to sneak in poor science into the literature that can then be cited, either via 
Crossref (as a result of having a DOI), or via Google Scholar. Thus, a link between academic 
quality and APC might be emerging, even if false, since the concept that a low APC = low 
quality20,21 may be conflagrated by no-APC preprints. Ultimately, it will be authors, and their 
institutes and funders, who will be increasingly carrying the burden of the gold OA author-
pays publishing model (Al-Khatib and Teixeira da Silva, 2017) in which preprints may simply 
be serving as a “trap”, marketed falsely as a “free” and rapid publishing venue, in an attempt 
to then channel papers to profitable OA journals of partner publishers (possible collusion?) 
where APCs will then be extracted. 
Finally, a new academic threat in preprints has emerged: metrics. It is abundantly clear 
that journal-based metrics have failed the academic community since they have irreversibly 
corrupted the scholarly record. This has taken place by assigning a pseudo-academic value to 
a published paper based on its perceived “value” or “quality”, assessed erroneously and simply 
by the level at which the journal in which it was published has been cited. The most obvious 
metric is the Clarivate Analytics journal impact factor, but Elsevier’s CiteScore and other 
derivatives also serve as new corrupting factors, offering non-academic pseudo-quality value, 
using journal-based metrics, to extrapolate to author-based or article-based metrics (Teixeira 
da Silva, 2017f; Teixeira da Silva and Memon, 2017). This “impact” game, which has plagued 
traditional publishing, and which is often critiqued by preprint proponents, has now begin in 
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Conclusions 
Preprints for the biomedical sciences are increasing dramatically24. Following some major 
structural developments in 2016 and early 2017, several new preprint servers have emerged 
and a strong push is being made, strongly advocated by ASAPbio, to encourage biomedical 
scientists to first post their findings to preprint servers prior to submitting to a regular journal. 
The main reasons for promoting preprints, proponents will claim, is faster access to important 
findings, an additional step of journal-independent peer reviewer-free quality control, and a 
possible tool to increase reproducibility by serving as a platform to present contradictory data. 
What is not discussed that much, because exposing such risks would weaken the massive 
investments made thus far in preprints, is that preprints pose real academic and ethical risks. In 
order for current preprint servers to not become extinct like Nature Precedings, and to gain 
trust in biomedical researchers who would use their preprints to deposit their raw findings in a 
non-peer reviewed state, preprint proponents must show how they plan to deal with the 
“predatory” aspect of unscreened literature that may contain flaws, errors, factually false or 
fraudulent data or information, and which would clearly be harmful to both academia, and 
society. Preprint proponents like COS and ASAbio should also give public guarantees that 
preprints will not be gamed via their metricization. Unless these caveats are addressed openly, 
and discussed widely among academics, a crisis of trust in preprints may arise (Teixeira da 
Silva, 2017g). This is because preprints, by introducing potentially flawed data into the public 
domain, have the potential to harm OA as much as “predatory” OA journals (Eve and Priego, 
2017), introducing new risk into green OA, namely a cancer (the “predatory” nature and the 
hijacking of the OA movement and the fairness of APCs by for-profit vanity publishers) that 
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“I wish I had known  
when beginning 
‘A’ all that I had learned  
when I had finished 
‘Z’”1 
 
Extending the limits of the political effects and diplomatic steps, the war is the final outcome 
of dialogues and discourses – that failed. Due to the transformation of the state, symbolic wars 
nationally are followed by international conflicts. The Rhetorics of War in the Arts Conference 
at the Romanian Academy discussed the visual outcomes and the diversity of interpretations 
of the attitudes. 
 
Dr. Adrian-Silvan Ionescu is the director of the “G. Oprescu” Institute of Art History of the 
Romanian Academy and an Associate Professor at the National University of Arts in 
Bucharest. He received his Ph.D. in the history of Romanian photography and specialized in 
the history of civil and military costumes of the 19th century of fine arts and urban civilization. 
Ionescu lectured about the Cartoons in Occupied Bucharest (1917-1918) and the attention to 
local circumstances and characters. Discussed military events, such as satirizing profiteers, 
shortages of goods, forced leisure of activities, and even Romanian political characters that 
brought the country to its knees – at the occupied south of Romanian territories. The satirical 
drawings were supposed to cheer up the solders that experienced first hand the country that 
was destroyed by the Central Powers. World War I represents an important landmark in the 
development of the Romanian satirical drawing. 
 
Adriana Dumitran analyzed two visual discourses that were used during the neutrality years of 
war between 1914-16. Including political figures of the moment and portraits of the leaders of 
belligerent armies and war scenes from the military conflict zones, which especially destroyed 
                                                 
1 Pearce-Moses, Richard (2005): A Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology. The Society of 
American Archivists, Chicago p. 27. 
 
KOME − An International Journal of Pure 
Communication Inquiry 
Volume 5 Issue 2, p. 81-84. 
© The Author(s) 2017 
Reprints and Permission: 
kome@komejournal.com 





Rhetorics of War in the Arts, 
A Century of War (1917-2017). 
Bucharest, Rhetorics of War in the 
Arts International Conference 
 
Kemenesi, Zs.                                                                                                                           82 
 
key institutions and monuments. Adriana Dumitran’s sensibility is shown by the subject matter 
that was chosen: the years of neutrality. The texts expressed the control and understatement 
imposed by military neutrality, and at the same time war was viewed through photographs and 
illustrations, which aimed and expressed in the press the reality of war through visual forms. 
Adriana Dumitran is the expert of the Romanian history of photography 1960-1919 and 
librarian at the National Library of Romania.      
 
According to Ramona Caramelea children’s publications maintained the culture of war aiming 
to sensitize young people to military values. Ramona Caramelea lectured about the Images of 
War in Romanian Children’s Magazines (1939-45) highlighting the shocking fact that military 
actions during the 20th century are not limited to war confrontations. By mobilizing intellectual 
and material resources aiming to sensitize children to military values throughout stories that 
were seemingly unrelated to war. The illustrations of children’s books and magazines conveyed 
the message of political iconography and ideology. The images supported the narrative that 
was supposed to promote the culture of war. 
   
Steve Yates is an expert of history of early modern photography, the first and only Fulbright 
Scholar who received the prestigious award three times to the USSR, Russia, Ukraine, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus in 1991, and Russia in 1995 and 2007. Yates’s keynote lecture 
Inventing Modern Photomontage to Guernica: Artistic Actions from World Wars contained a 
general approach to the aesthetics of war. “War is a catalyst to prototypes of modern innovation 
and invention in the arts.” Yates’ lecture embraced the anti-art and nontraditional forms that 
influenced transdisciplinary directions. Events beginning a century ago in World Wars also 
meant inventions and innovations in the arts in response, expressing another future with 
original styles that unfolded throughout the 20 th century.  
  
Celina Lunsford’s lecture concerned the Fashion Photography Reflecting Crisis and Hope. 
Louise Dahl-Wolfe and The Harper’s Bazaar Years during WWII and the Beginning of Cold 
War. As America’s oldest fashion Magazine, Harper’s Bazaar kept working during the crises 
of the Great Depression leading to World War II. Maintaining this public interest even during 
the economic crises and boom of the global expansion of American ideologies. Politics and 
developing world events continually influenced the choice of locations of the photographs. 
Lunsford gave great insight to the ambivalence of the crises and hopes that ruled common sense 
during WWII, from her aspects as Artistic Director and experience at the Fotografie Forum 
Frankfurt.  
 
In his lecture War Trauma and Book Market in Interwar Romania, Bogdan Popa, a researcher 
of the “N. Iorga” Institute of History of the Romanian Academy, investigated the effects of 
exploring writing of the novel and publishing activities during WWI. Resulting in the diversity 
of military, political and social events during the war. This was still limited to war memorials 
and overshadowed by the Great War. Giving the opportunity to the small, yet growing public 
that read about the unprecedented and individual trauma, giving the obvious need to humans. 
 
Musicologist at the “G. Oprescu” Institute of Art History of the Romanian Academy, Marian 
Lupaşcu, studies the Romanian, Armenian and Gypsy musical traditions that are connected to 
war and soldiering topics. The research focused on the rural folk music, rites and ceremonials, 
genres, repertoires, as well as the area of theoretical interest. Furthermore research includes the 
topic of methodology of musical structure like rhythm, pitch, architectonic systems and 
transcription, maintaining their cultural and ethnic identity in a foreign and, most of the time, 
in an unsympathetic environment.  
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Carmen Popa spoke about the Deeply Impacting Echoes of the Two World Wars in Romanian 
Music. The ethical and aesthetic survey involves the most impressive moments of Romanian 
history. Lofty sounds about the Romanian spirit, as they always fought defensively, wisely, 
safeguarding wholeheartedly their land, for their nation with faith, with bright minds and big 
hearts, even as a mixed choir and small orchestra. 
 
Literary quality and historical truth presented by Romanian writers investigate both the 
personal and collective war experience. Yet this was rather limited to war memorials and 
overshadowed by the Great War. Giving the obvious need to a small, yet growing public that 
read about an unprecedented collective and individual trauma.  
 
According to Virginia Barbu a strong personality of the interwar Romanian art was Ion 
Theodorescu-Sion (1882-1932). One of the exponents of the “national-style” in painting, 
remarkable for a sharp and clear outline and at the same time its sobriety of physiognomes. 
Elena-Christina Brăgea lectured about the fact that when Romania was in its active neutrality 
period, the diplomatic, military and social preparations were “made in order to enter the war in 
convenient conditions.” The neutrality and dynamics of the military actions were about to 
increase the sympathy towards the Allies and pushed forward all Romanians to a political unity 
and a feeling of a homogeneous country. Furnica included cartoons, verses, maxims, thoughts, 
and epigrams that were signed by Francis Sirato and some other talented cartoonists. 
 




The images of belligerent countries, the atmosphere of daily life in different places, were 
shaping the ideas of war. Last but not least, Elena-Christina Brăgea analyzed the relationship 
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between the public and the magazine in order to identify the interdependencies between them 
– it’s a territory of wisdom.  Elena-Christina Brăgea approaches the field by the history of 
political science, pursuing Ph.D. studies at L’École Doctorale francophone en Sciences 
Sociales. 
 
After 1945 the society was brainwashed, mostly by party propaganda patterns. Idealizing their 
interests, erasing some entire chapters of the recent past, and wishing to control better the 
present. However with this intention there was no trust any more in the newly installed power. 
According to the statement by Manuela Cernat for filmmakers were not allowed to speak all 
over the country about the unpleasant side of life. Quite a convincing thesis. There is a lot to 
learn from Manuela Cernat who served as a jury member for over 200 national and international 
film festivals such as Cannes, Berlin, Venice, San Sebastian, Bergamo, Valladolid, Bilbao, 
New Delhi and other cities globally. 
 
The anti-war artists presented by Andrea Domesle dealt with the present. The Basel based 
theorist focused on relevant socio-political themes, highlighting differences between national 
narratives about the war and the cultures commemorating it. Part of the approach is to 
distinguish the private memory and the collective memory.   
 
Petter Österland’s lecture “In the Eyes of the War: A Collection of First World War Stereo 
Photos” included some after-battle pictures, and certainly the ‘corps of the unknown’ before 
they entered the great slaughter. “Less horror, less dead, less misery” was the intellectual aspect 
to the war. Men that, through the fine excellence and quality of the photographs, came so close 
in time and vision.  
 
The years of neutrality of European war was also presented. Adrian Dumitran said “two visual 
discourses were used during the neutrality years with which the public was already accustomed: 
portraits of the leaders of the belligerent armies, political figures of the moment, and war scenes 
from all the military conflict zones, destroyed cities and monuments.” Inaugurating the 
chemical weapons, tank battles and involving aerial bombardments, the victims discreetly 
disappeared, But some of the stories, especially the stories of the enemies, were passed on to 
their children and grandchildren. Overall the characteristics of the dominators were the same 
all over the world, not counting on the effects of their own children. From the rich photographic 
material left behind after conflicts, by those who made the details of war as documents, we can 
actually read the destiny of their entire family. Bogdan-Gheorghe Iorga lectured from an aspect 
that the Great War was the first war that was mapped by the photography. 
 
There is an extended amount of images that reflected the impacts on life of a certain 
community. Silvana Rachieru Assistant Professor at the Faculty of History, University of 
Bucharest is an expert of the Romanian-Ottoman Relations between 1878-1908. After nine 
years experience in cultural diplomacy and receiving her Ph.D. in the History considered, she 
is an acknowledged expert on social and diplomatic history of the Ottoman Empire and 
Romanian-Ottoman relations during the 19th century.  
 
At the Romanian Academy speakers including historians, art historians and artists summarized 
an entire situation in one glance. The “Rhetoric of War in the Arts” Conference dealt with real 
events with plausible narrations and unpublished contributions.  
 
